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ACCOUNTING AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
BRITAIN, SPAIN AND THE ASIENTO TREATY 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The boundaries between accounting and law are contingent on time-space 
intersections. Here, these margins are explored in the realm of international relations 
by focusing on the Asiento, an 18th century treaty granting Britain the monopoly to 
trade slaves with the Spanish American colonies. Although a relatively minor 
concern of treaty-makers, noncompliance with provisions of the Asiento by the South 
Sea Company placed accounting centre stage in conflicts between Britain and Spain. 
In combination with geo-strategic and domestic political circumstances, reporting 
failures exacerbated the commercial dispute between the two nations which 
culminated in war in 1739. The accounting provisions of the Asiento are examined 
by drawing on managerialist and realist theories of treaty compliance. It is shown 
that British noncompliance with accounting obligations under the treaty was driven 
by realist self-interest and the maximisation of material gain. Given that such 
motivations dominated behaviour attempts to manage noncompliance through the 
routine processes and structures of international politics proved unsuccessful. 
Managerial devices such as diplomatic exchanges over treaty ambiguity and securing 
greater informational transparency merely provided further opportunities for the 
pursuit of self-interest. It is suggested that divergent perceptions of the role of 
accounting in international relations stem from the unique political, legal, social and 
cultural configurations of nation states. The study highlights the limitations of 
accounting as an instrument of treaty verification. Its effectiveness in that capacity is 
diminished where there is no shared understanding of the significance, purpose, 
content and interpretation of accounting information.  
 
 
Keywords: accounting, treaty compliance, Asiento, international relations, 
managerialism, realism, Britain, Spain. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent decades, a number of studies have examined the boundaries of accounting 
and its relationship with other disciplines (Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes & 
Nahapiet, 1980; Hopwood, 1983, 1992; Klamer & McCloskey, 1992; Miller, 1998). 
Particular attention has been devoted to the interface between accounting and law 
because the law has had a “visibly significant influence on both accounting practice 
and thought” (Napier & Noke, 1992, p. 30; Martens & McEnroe, 1991, 1998; 
Bromwich & Hopwood, 1992; Freedman & Power, 1992; Sugarman, 1995; Walton, 
1993; Napier, 1998b; Pong, 1999; Walker, 2004). Prior research has advanced 
understanding of the respective roles of the two disciplines and its practitioners in 
reform of the social and economic spheres (Napier, 1998a) and has examined the 
subordinated status of accounting vis-à-vis law (Johnson, 1981). Studies indicate that 
the dominant position of law has not been stable over time and space. Indeed, “the 
emergence of accounting from under the wing of law can be seen as having given 
rise to numerous tensions” (Miller & Power, 1992, p. 232). Such tensions are not 
universal (Camfferman, 2007) and it is suggested that their investigation be 
conducted “by reference to nationally and historically-specific instances” (Miller & 
Power, 1992, p. 232).  
 
In this paper we seek to extend knowledge of the interface between accounting and 
law by venturing into the field of international relations (Carnegie & Napier, 2002; 
Richardson & MacDonald, 2002). This is attempted by examining an historical 
episode which focuses on the role of accounting in treaty compliance and 
enforcement - a subject which merits greater attention in both the accounting and 
international relations literatures.  
 
Our empirical focus is on the Asiento, the 18th century contract under which Britain 
was granted a monopoly to supply slaves to the Spanish colonies in Latin America. 
In particular, we analyse the period 1711-1739 which spans the negotiations 
preceding the Asiento treaty and the circumstances leading to the War of Jenkins’ 
Ear between Britain and Spain. Our examination reveals the significance of various 
features of this time-space intersection. Britain and Spain had different legal, 
constitutional and socio-cultural traditions – most notably Britain boasted a system 
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of common law and constitutional monarchy, whereas in Spain a system of civil law 
and an absolute monarchy prevailed (LaPorta et al, 1998). The observation period 
also witnessed diverse economic conditions in the focal countries; an upsurge of 
overseas trade (often termed the ‘commercial revolution’) in Britain (Clapham, 
1949; Mathias, 1969, pp. 92-106) and depleted national finances and substantial state 
intervention in Spain (Alvarez-Dardet et al, 2002). From these divergent contexts 
emerged variations between the two countries in the demands made of and for 
accounting, control and accountability in international agreements.  
 
As will be illustrated later, when combined with other sources of tension, disputes 
between nation states over accounting could become so heated as to culminate in 
armed conflict. In this way the paper also seeks to contribute to another developing 
theme in accounting research. A number of scholars have investigated the impact of 
military crisis, and total war in particular, on the deployment and development of 
accounting technologies, accounting regulation and the advance of the profession 
(Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991; Loft, 1994; Walker & Shackleton, 1995; Walker, 2000). 
Other studies have enhanced our understanding of the importance of administrative 
failures and accounting deficiencies in the conduct of wars (Funnell, 1990, 2005), 
shown how the deployment of accounting could condition the discourse of war and 
mediate relations between political and military complexes (Chwastiak, 2001, 2006), 
and illustrated the manner in which accounting can reflect and become embroiled in 
ideological contests during armed conflict (Fernández-Revuelta, Gómez & Robson, 
2002). In the current paper we identify another dimension of the study of accounting 
and war: how the failure by one nation to account under treaty obligations could 
contribute to an impasse in bilateral relations which, when compounded by strategic 
and domestic factors, culminated in military aggression.  
 
In focusing on the role of accounting in mediating relationships between nation 
states the study engages with a sub-discipline of history which seldom features in 
accounting. During the nineteenth century it was in diplomatic history that the 
advance of scientific method in historical scholarship primarily took place. Narrating 
histories of statecraft, foreign policy and high politics, as revealed in treaties, 
diplomatic papers and other official papers, dominated the history research agenda in 
nationalist and imperialist Europe.i Subsequently, the focus of historians shifted 
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towards more expansive and inclusive agendas which encompassed the economic 
and socio-cultural foundations of international relations. With its emphasis on 
‘courts and cabinets’ diplomatic history became perceived as the moribund study of 
power elites (Marwick, 1989, pp. 93-94). 
 
Diplomatic history has often been degraded as the dry record “of what one clerk 
wrote to another clerk”, despite the fact that what the bureaucrat inscribed may have 
impacted on numerous lives (Vincent, 1996, p. 69). More recently the essential focus 
of diplomatic history on sovereign states has been considered irrelevant in the 
context of declining territoriality and advancing globalisation (Maier, 2000). While 
some commentators have perceived the demise of diplomatic history since 1945 (see, 
for example, Vincent, 1996, p. 151) others have sought its revival by accommodating 
wider frames of reference (Watt et al, 1988). A number of diplomatic historians in 
the US in particular, have argued the relevance of their subject to contemporary 
geopolitics and globalisation debates, indicated the potential it offers for 
interdisciplinary engagement and critical approaches, and asserted the opportunities 
it provides for exploring identities, cultures and non-state actors in international 
relations (Hogan, 2004; Stephanson, 1998; Zeiler, 2001).  
 
The current investigation is supported by a wide range of primary sources. Even 
though the availability of archival materials has been regarded as a major constraint 
to performing comparative research in accounting history (Richardson & 
MacDonald, 2002), the case presented here draws on a wealth of surviving 
documents on international relations. The use of material contained in the archives of 
the two focal countries concerned also offered the advantages of triangulation and 
helped expose differing interpretations of the same events. Archival evidence for 
Spain was gathered from the Archivo General de Indias (General Archive of Indias, 
AGI) – Spanish American Colonies, in Seville. This was supplemented by evidence 
gathered from the Archivo General de Simancas (General Archive of Simancas, 
AGS, in Simancas) and the Archivo Histórico Nacional (Archive of National 
History, AHN, in Madrid). For Britain the principal source was state papers in the 
National Archives, London. ii Secondary sources included books and articles on 
Anglo-Spanish relations during the first half of the eighteenth century. The majority 
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of the latter sources were produced during the highpoint of diplomatic history, from 
the end of the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. 
 
As well as attracting the attention of historians of diplomacy, Anglo-Spanish 
relations have also begun to feature in the accounting literature (Donoso, 2008). The 
current paper differs from this study in a number of respects. Whereas Donoso 
(2008) draws on Spanish primary sources (mostly gathered from AGS) as the basis 
of a descriptive account of events in the period 1737-1750, focusing on the War of 
Jenkins’ Ear and the negotiations that led to a peace settlement, this investigation 
draws on sources located in Spain and Britain to offer a theoretically informed 
exploration of the relationship between accounting and law in the realm of 
international relations for the period 1711-1739. To achieve this we focus on 
accounting, transparency and reporting through the lenses of managerialist and 
realist approaches to understanding treaty compliance and noncompliance. 
 
The paper is structured thus. In the following section we consider the literature on 
international relations, theories of treaty behaviour and the role of informational 
transparency and reporting - including accounting - in compliance. We then describe 
the main features of the Asiento treaty and its conduct by the South Sea Company 
(SSC) (the Assientists). The formal requirement imposed on the SSC by the Asiento 
treaty to account to the Court of Spain is then related. The motives behind 
noncompliance with the terms of the treaty by the SSC are then explored. Responses 
to noncompliance and the conflicts which ensued, such as bilateral commissions and 
diplomatic exchanges, are examined in the context of managerialist and realist 
theories of treaty behaviour. There follows a narration of how the failure to resolve 
disputes between Britain and Spain over accounting for the Asiento featured in 
discourses preceding the outbreak of war. In the conclusion we reflect on the 
dynamic relationship between accounting and law and the implications of our 
findings for theories of treaty behaviour and the functioning of accounting as a 
technology of compliance. 
 
Treaties, compliance and reporting 
 
A treaty is a written agreement “(i) between one or more States and one or more 
international organizations; or (ii) between international organizations, whether that 
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agreement is embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments 
and whatever its particular designation” (Reuter, 1995, p. 246). The agreement may 
be designated a contract, protocol, convention, pact or other descriptor. The specific 
term ‘treaty’ is usually applied to international instruments relating to matters of 
particular import and solemnity, such as peace, disarmament and the determination 
of national borders (http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp).  
 
Historically, treaties have been the principal instrument of international relations. 
The exclusive right of states to treat was established in Europe during the 
seventeenth century (Holzgreve, 1989) and during the eighteenth century treaties 
became the main source of the law of nations (Nussbaum, 1953, pp. 144-174). 
Agreements involving several countries were often codified in a series of bilateral 
treaties between monarchical heads of state (as at the Peace of Utrecht, 1713). 
Subsequently, multilateral instruments became more usual and were extended in the 
modern age to subjects of common interest to the international community (Reuter, 
1995, pp. 2-16). 
 
Managerialism and realism  
 
The history of international relations shows that nations do not always adhere to 
provisions stated in treaties. In consequence, there is much interest in treaty 
behaviour - comprehending the motives for noncompliance and the systems and 
mechanisms which encourage compliance (Mitchell, 1994, p. 28; Keeley, 1998; 
Simmons, 2000). Students of international regulatory regimes deploy two principal 
theories to understand compliance - the managerialist approach and the realist 
approach (Simmons, 1998; Donnelly, 2000). Fundamentally, managerialists assume 
that the behaviour of states is driven by normative expectations while mainstream 
realists argue the primacy of interest protection.  
 
Proponents of the managerial approach refer to the wider notion of pacta sunt 
servanda, that is, treaties are binding (Chayes & Chayes, 1995, p. 8). In addition to 
explaining the legal and ethical motivations for compliance, managerialists perceive 
compliance as a behavioural expectation, a presumption, such that in practice nations 
have a “general propensity to comply with international obligations” (Chayes & 
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Chayes, 1995, p. 3). Conversely, noncompliance represents deviance (Chayes & 
Chayes, 1993) and results in nations incurring reputational costs (Simmons, 2000). 
From a managerialist perspective international relations takes place in a dynamic 
context from which may emerge three potential sources of noncompliance: (i) 
changed understandings of treaty provisions facilitated by ambiguity and 
indeterminate language in the original treaty; (ii) nations’ miscalculations of their 
own technological, scientific, military, financial or administrative capabilities to 
comply; and (iii) the emergence of uncontrollable socioeconomic or political 
changes since the treaty was signed (Chayes & Chayes, 1995, pp. 9-17).  
 
Given these sources of noncompliance and the general propensity of states to adhere 
to their treaty obligations, managerialists consider that devising punitive enforcement 
mechanisms to secure compliance is needless. Rather, they contend that 
noncompliance “can be managed by routine international political processes” 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 204) such as dispute resolution and persuasion, and 
through the provision of assistance to remedy incapacity to comply.  
 
The managerial, norm-driven, view of treaty compliance has attracted criticism 
(Colgan, 2006). Most notably Downs et al (1996, p. 380) argue that supposedly high 
levels of treaty compliance is symptomatic of the fact that “most treaties require 
states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the 
absence of an agreement”. By reference to historical examples Downs et al (1996) 
contest the managerialist explanations for noncompliance and observe that a state’s 
commitment to compliance is advanced “cautiously or cynically” rather than 
genuinely (Simmons, 1998, p. 76). The authors emphasise the need for enforcement 
and punishment regimes to make treaties stick as opposed to reliance on the mere 
management of dispute resolution and addressing incapacity issues. Such regulatory 
regimes become necessary because fundamentally, it is self-interest that dictates the 
willingness of states to comply with treaty provisions.   
 
The argument that nations only comply with treaties when it is in their interests to do 
so is associated with realist theory, which portrays the international system “as a 
brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and 
therefore have little reason to trust each other” (Mearsheimer, 1994). Realism 
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comprises diverse streams. For example, biological realists emphasise the manner in 
which international politics are conditioned by the fundamentals of human nature, 
and in particular, the pursuit of egoism (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 44-50). Early classical 
realists such as Machiavelli and Hobbes argued that men are competitive and 
protective, motivated to seek gain and glory rather than the pursuit of a common 
good. Given their egoistic motives men are conflictual and untrustworthy (Donelan, 
1990, p. 23). Biological realists contend that the behaviour of states can be 
understood as an extension of the self-centred individual with the added dimension 
that in international relations untrustworthiness and conflict are exacerbated by 
factors such as nationalism, cultural differences and less than perfect knowledge of 
the intentions of competitor states (Donelan, 1990, pp. 23-27).  
 
As structural realists also emphasise, in the absence of an overarching common 
authority, the international stage is the site of an anarchic struggle for power, wealth 
and security between autonomous states (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 81-89). Further, states 
not only seek the maximization and protection of absolute gains of power and wealth 
but also the maximisation of gains relative to other states (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 58-
60). This competitiveness reduces the scope for international cooperation, 
particularly in the longer term. In these contexts, cooperation becomes “difficult to 
achieve … and always difficult to sustain” (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 12).  
 
For the realist, competition persists within cooperative ventures such as treaties. 
Agreements which contain opaque, complex and ambiguous provisions can offer 
additional scope for the pursuit of self-interest. Such opacity render accusations of 
violation difficult to sustain and offer ‘wiggle room’ when implementation issues 
arise or conditions change. Consequential attempts at dispute resolution provide an 
opportunity for a state “to appear superficially reasonable while straight-forwardly 
pursuing its material self-interest” (Colgan, 2006, p. 55), and this is exacerbated by 
the dynamic character of international relations. The realist approach to compliance 
also recognises the importance of the context in which the treaty was made and 
operates; this may present scope for invoking moral, ideological or other reasons for 
legitimating violations.  
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Thus, in realist approaches to international relations the maximisation of the power 
and material self-interest of a nation are prioritised over moral and ethical 
considerations of treaty compliance (Donelan, 1990, p. 24). Indeed “realism 
maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states” 
(Morgenthau, 1954, p. 9). National governments behave as self-maximising rational 
actors. If they calculate that the material benefits of treaty violation outweigh its 
costs it is in the state’s interest not to comply with all or some of the treaty’s 
provisions. Hence, for realists, treaty rules do not cause compliance. In practice 
treaties are frequently adhered to because they reflect the interests of powerful states 
or because the costs of noncompliance are too high.  
 
As the foregoing suggests, although its adherents may share some key 
assumptions there exists a variety of realist approaches to the study of treaty 
compliance. Relatedly, the extent to which the realist and managerialist 
positions can be characterised as polar extremes can be challenged. There are 
commonalities and gradations. At a basic level both approaches accept that 
nations will often fulfil treaty commitments and both expect violations to 
occur (Mitchell, 1994, pp. 6-9). Further, managerialists concede that nations 
would not enter into treaties in the first place if it were against their interest 
to do so. Contemporary realists accept that normative behaviour features in 
the determination of the costs and benefits of compliance and that the notion 
of making all decisions on the basis of a rigorous calculation of absolute and 
relative gains is unlikely (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Mearsheimer, 1994). It 
can also be argued that both approaches offer an overly simplistic notion of 
causality and behaviour in the complex realm of international agreements, 
which, in reality, involves mixed motive game playing and degrees of 
compliance in rapidly shifting contexts (Downs, 1993). 
It is also important in the current study to recognise that compliance or 
noncompliance may be driven by forces within the state, such as the populace as a 
whole, the ruling elite or other influential parties. The demands of powerful domestic 
pressure groups are likely to be more immediate than assuaging the distant concerns 
of overseas nations. In the realm of modern environmental treaties, for instance 
“Powerful non-state actors, including multinational corporations, non-governmental 
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environmental groups, and scientists, often influence international politics both 
directly and by helping to define state interests” (Mitchell, 1994, p. 36). Downs et al 
(1996, p. 394) argue that the most obvious causes of noncompliance feature “the 
demands of domestic interest groups and the significant political benefits often 
associated with protection”. In relation to the case explored here noncompliance was 
particularly motivated by the British state’s pursuit of geo-strategic interests in 
Latin-America activated through the agency of the South Sea Company. 
    
Informational transparency and compliance  
 
Students of international relations recognise the importance of transparency, 
reporting, verification and monitoring to the achievement of treaty compliance. 
Whereas realists doubt the impact of such mechanisms on behaviour, especially 
where the benefits of cheating are evident (Downs et al, 1996), managerialists 
contend that, given the propensity of states to adhere to treaty rules, such processes 
can encourage compliance. Consequently the design of the compliance system 
associated with an international agreement becomes significant (Mitchell, 1994, p. 
52). Managerialists argue that compliance regimes focused on coercive enforcement 
are not viable. Rather a managerial strategy is necessary which reinforces the 
normative predilection of states to adhere to obligations by removing obstacles to 
compliance in a cooperative spirit. A number of devices may be employed in this 
regard. These include establishing institutional arrangements for resolving disputes 
between parties over ambiguous treaty provisions; attempting to persuade a party to 
comply; and, where deficient, providing technical, administrative or financial 
capacity to enable compliance (Chayes & Chayes, 1995, pp. 24-28). Another, key, 
mechanism is to ensure informational transparency:  
 
The major goal of any treaty’s compliance information system is to maximize transparency. 
Transparency refers to both the amount and quality of the information collected on compliance or 
non-compliance by the regulated actors as well as the degree of analysis and dissemination of this 
information. Increasing transparency is seen as an essential component of any prescription to increase 
compliance (Mitchell, 1994, p. 57). 
 
Similarly, neoliberal institutionalist theories of international relations emphasise the 
manner in which international rules and organisations can encourage cooperation by 
requiring the gathering and distribution of reliable information about the behaviour 
of states. The exchange of “high quality information reduces uncertainty” while 
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asymmetric information, deception, non-disclosure and other impediments to data 
communication encourage conflict (Keohane, 1982, p. 344). International 
cooperation is stifled by impediments to “the honest sharing of information” 
(Morrow, 1994, p. 388). Political scientists also indicate that slippage from full 
compliance is unavoidable in real-world contexts where complete information and 
perfect observation (as in treaties monitoring) are not attainable (Bednar, 2006). The 
temptation to cheat always exists, even when relations between parties are 
cooperative (Ostrom, 1999). Bednar (2006, p. 350) argues “when we are asked to do 
something that is costly for us to do, and we know that others can’t see our action 
perfectly, we shirk a little bit. The general phenomenon is true whether we are 
talking about a law, a pact among friends, an organizational norm, or a treaty 
between nations”.  
 
The collection and distribution of information about a signatory’s treaty performance 
is thus widely perceived as essential to encouraging reciprocity, providing 
reassurance to other parties that they are not being taken advantage of, reinforcing 
the adherence of independent actors to treaty norms, and deterring noncompliance 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1995, pp. 23-24, 135-153). For managerialists transparency is an 
important factor in compliance because it enables the revelation of departures from 
prescribed conduct and allows the miscreant to be called to account. Essential to 
transparency is the reporting of data on treaty performance. In the case of trade 
treaties such as the Asiento, accounting was identified as an important device for 
monitoring, reporting and achieving transparency.  
 
Regular, complete and accurate reporting is a key element of the achievement of 
treaty objectives and compliance (Mitchell, 1994, pp. 123-124). Reporting regimes 
feature significantly in contemporary treaties: “So common and embracing are these 
provisions that they risk information overload, in which reports, notices, requests for 
information far outstrip the ability of national and international bureaucracies to 
produce or to process and assimilate the product” (Chayes & Chayes, 1995, p. 172). 
Students of compliance explore the quality of extant reporting systems, the 
implications of the widespread use of self as opposed to independent reporting, the 
impacts of publication on compliance, and factors which incentivise and 
disincentivise the submission of comprehensive reports. In relation to the latter it has 
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been suggested of environmental treaties that “In self-reporting systems, states or 
other actors will not report if they believe that revealing their own noncompliance 
will prove more costly than remaining silent” (Mitchell, 1994, p. 144). Moreover 
“the refusal to report is often the first intimation of serious political resistance to 
compliance with basic treaty norms and it begins the mobilization of 
counterpressures” (Chayes & Chayes, 1995, p. 155).  
 
The need to ascertain the reliability of self-reported data encourages the use of 
verification and monitoring procedures. The existence and activation of these 
processes encourage truth-telling by the declarant but, as in the case explored here, 
“some reporting systems seem to be designed to make it difficult for outside 
agencies and parties to verify the accuracy and completeness of required reports” 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1995, p. 165). In instances where verification is compromised by 
the withholding, destruction or loss of data, or where values of data disclosed are 
susceptible to subjective determination, the risk of intentional misreporting is 
increased. Verification and monitoring can also be complicated where reporting 
depends on affected individuals and corporations as opposed to governments, and 
where transparency involves the disclosure of confidential business information 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1995, pp. 166-167, 190-191).  
 
The interdisciplinary study of treaty verification currently explores the manifold 
issues and complexities of devising and implementing technologies of measurement 
(Avenhaus et al, 2006) as well as systems of data gathering and monitoring. During 
the eighteenth century, the period of the present study, verification relied heavily on 
data gathered from documentation, oral testimony and inspection. iii
 
 In respect of 
treaties concerning navigation and trade, evidence from books of account, 
inventories and certificates could feature large. For example, in the commercial 
treaty concluded by Britain and France at Utrecht in 1713, accounting was an 
important monitoring technology - merchants on both sides were to keep accounts 
and papers without the threat of “search and molestation” and these were to be 
submitted to the courts in their entirety should a controversy or dispute arise (A 
Collection of Treaties, 1714, p. 283; AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2785).  
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In what follows it is shown that while managerialist theory aids an understanding of 
the institutions established to address compliance issues arising from the operation of 
the Asiento treaty, it is realist theories which best explain the motives behind the 
behaviour of the states involved. It is suggested that in a context where the advance 
and protection of self-interest prevailed, accounting proved an imperfect instrument 
of treaty verification. However, before this analysis commences it is necessary to 
describe the international agreement under scrutiny.  
 
The Asiento and the South Sea Company 
 
The Asiento treaty between England and Spain was signed during a period when 
mercantilist policy dominated international trade and when political and commercial 
agreements were increasingly subject to separate treaties (Nussbaum, 1953, pp. 126-
128). 
 
In 1700 Carlos II, the last Habsburg king of Spain, died without issue and named the 
Duke of Anjou, the grandson of King Louis XIV of France, as heir to the Spanish 
throne. The Duke of Anjou would become Philip V. This succession was deemed 
unacceptable by countries such as England and Holland on the grounds that if France 
and Spain were governed by the same royal house, the Bourbons, the balance of 
power in Europe would be disrupted (Lynch, 1999). This conflict resulted in the War 
of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713.  
 
In April 1711 Britain commenced negotiations with France to reach a peace 
settlement and in January 1712 multilateral discussions to end the War of Succession 
were convened at Utrecht (McKay & Scott, 1983, pp. 63-66). In spring 1713 Britain 
signed bilateral treaties with France and with Spain – referred to as the Peace of 
Utrecht. Philip V was recognised as King of Spain. He renounced any rights to 
ascend to the French throne and the disputed inheritance of Spanish dominions was 
divided among various powers. During this period Spanish policy was largely 
determined by France. Indeed, the principal elements of the treaty between Britain 
and Spain had been negotiated between Britain and France (Jover Zamora, 1985). 
Subscription to a bilateral agreement with Britain was greeted with some reluctance 
by the Spanish who determined to revise the Treaty of Utrecht and its associated 
agreements at the earliest opportunity (Zeller, 1955). 
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During the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Utrecht Britain and Holland claimed 
the right to free trade with the Spanish possessions in Latin America. Further, the 
British demanded the Asiento - the exclusive right to supply slaves to the Spanish 
dominions. Imported slaves were necessary to meet the high demand for labour in 
colonial outposts and because it was forbidden to enslave the depleted indigenous 
populations of the Americas (Palmer, 1981, pp. 3-4). Traditionally, Spain had 
outsourced the Asiento as it lacked possessions in Africa from which a supply slaves 
to the Americas could be secured. Since the early sixteenth century the contract had 
been placed with various parties including the Genoese and the Portuguese (Kamen, 
2002, pp. 430-431; Pares, 1936, pp. 10-11). Increasingly, the issue became 
embroiled in international diplomacy such that from 1702 to 1712 the Asiento was 
contracted to France through the instrument of a treaty (McLachlan, 1940, pp. 22-29; 
Scelle, 1910). The subsequent Asiento with Britain, the focus here, has been 
described as “a true treaty” (Scelle, 1910, p. 654). 
 
In England the question in 1711 was not so much whether the Asiento could be 
obtained by the British government but, “to whom the privileges which it carried 
could be entrusted” (Donnan, 1730, p. 421). A bill creating the South Sea Company 
was introduced to the House of Commons in May 1711. The SSC, a hybrid of a 
private and public entity (Paul, 2006), was regarded as the “masterpiece” of Robert 
Harley, Earl of Oxford and Lord Treasurer, who perceived it as a way of funding the 
national debt (Thomas, 1998). The British Crown had considerable financial interests 
in the SSC, and this resulted in the appointment of the Prince of Wales and King 
George I as governors in 1715 and 1718 respectively.  
 
The treaty of peace and friendship concluded between Britain and Spain at Utrecht in 
1713 provided that “The Catholick King grants to her Britannick Majesty, exclusive 
of the subjects of Spain and all others, the Contract of carrying Blacks into the 
Spanish West-Indies for the Space of Thirty Years, beginning from the first Day of 
May, 1713, on the same Conditions as the French enjoy’d it” (A Collection of 
Treaties, 1714). This term represented a considerable increase over the ten years 
granted to the previous French contractors (Thomas, 1998, p. 234). Shortly before 
the Asiento treaty was signed on 26 March 1713 Philip V proposed to annex an 
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article which would permit the annual loading of a vessel of 500 tons with duty free 
merchandise to trade with the Spanish Indies (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 
2773). Although the Consejo de Indias (Board of Trade with Latin America) advised 
against the proposal of an annual ship the King granted it in compensation for the 
losses which were expected to arise from the trade in slaves.  
 
The Asiento treaty also provided that the King of Spain would be entitled to one 
quarter of the total profit earned from the annual ship plus five percent of earnings 
that pertained to the British three-quarters, that is, a total of 28.75% of the net 
income of each annual vessel (A Collection of all the Treaties, 1785, Vol. 1; AGI. 
Indiferente General. Legajo 2769. L8-28). Lord Lexington, British ambassador to 
Madrid and a key negotiator of the treaty, reported that this would be “the best 
Asiento that was ever made and a more advantageous Treaty of commerce [than] any 
nation yet had” (Jover Zamora, 1985, p. 391). By contrast the British envoy to 
Madrid considered the treaty “calculated for captiousness and chicane” (quoted in 
Palmer, 1981, p. 10).  
 
As expected, the British Government remitted the operation of the Asiento to the 
newly chartered SSC in return for £7.5m (Thomas, 1998, p. 233). Importantly, the 
SSC (the Assientists) had secured a supply of slaves through close co-operation with 
the Royal African Company (Paul, 2006). The Asiento stipulated the delivery of 
144,000 Piezas de Indiaiv to the Spanish Americas, that is, 4,800 Negroes per year, 
until May 1743. The Negroes were to be “of the regular standard of seven quarters, 
not being old or defective” (Collection of all the Treaties, 1785).  For each Pieza of 
slave sent to ports in the Indies where a Spanish official was present, the British were 
to pay a duty of 33 1/3 pesos escudos de plata (pieces of eight)v to the Crown of 
Spain (Palmer, 1981, pp. 9-10). The Assientists were also to advance 200,000 pieces 
of eight to the Spanish, to be reimbursed from duties payable. However, the SSC 
failed to meet the annual quota of slaves and English traders independent of the 
company attempted to meet the shortfall, albeit illicitly. Palmer (1981, pp. 97-112) 
has estimated that the SSC delivered only 74,760 slaves to Spanish America, 1714-
1739 and that after the South Sea Bubble in 1720, with the exception of the annual 
ships and the pursuit of contraband trade, the company displayed limited interest in 
commercial activity.  
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Interests in the Asiento effectively comprised the SSC 45%, the British Crown 25% 
and the Spanish Crown 25% (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2769. L8-28; see 
also Bernal, 2001; Sorsby, 1975, pp. 16-17). The remaining 5% was granted to the 
individuals who had facilitated the negotiations which preceded the agreement. The 
25% owned by the Spanish was worth 1,000,000 silver pesos escudos. However, 
under the Asiento treaty it was agreed that the Spanish should not remit this amount 
to the Assientists who would provide finance at 8% interest. The King of Spain 
would receive his share of the profits of the Asiento every five years, plus annual 
duties payable on the import of Negroes, once the Assientists were reimbursed with 
interest. In the event that the SSC incurred losses the Spanish Crown was compelled 
to reimburse the Assientists in a manner least prejudicial to the royal revenues. 
 
The SSC agreed with the Spanish Crown to set up delivery and trading centres or 
‘factories’ in the Spanish Indies (Palmer, 1981, pp. 59-65). These establishments 
contained warehouses for the classification and storage of Negroes and provisions. 
The factories were located in various sites. Buenos Aires would receive slaves to be 
forwarded to Chile and Potosi; Cartagena would be the distribution centre for the 
mining areas in the north of South America; Panama and Porto Bello were to supply 
the market in Lima; Veracruz would distribute slaves across New Spain (modern day 
Mexico); and Havana and Santiago de Cuba would receive slaves to be used as 
manpower on island plantations. The three main operational centres for the import 
and distribution of Negroes and other merchandise were in Barbados, Buenos Aires 
and Jamaica (Nelson, 1945). Factories were run by six SSC factors (agents) or 
representatives, with the exception of the Havana and Santiago factories, which were 
administered by three factors each. The factors were remitted to conduct the sale of 
Negroes and to report to South Sea House in London every two years (Sorsby, 
1975). The factory’s accountant was responsible for bookkeeping and cash 
management.  
 
The slave ships were permitted to carry materials such as cables, candles, iron and 
wood as well as the necessary provisions to establish and conduct the trade. However 
these items were not to be transported for the purposes of sale in the American 
Indies. The Assientists were allowed to apply the proceeds of the sale of slaves to 
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acquire money, bars of gold and silver or other produce for shipment back to Europe 
(AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2769. L8-10). Following arrival in Britain an 
exact account of the ship’s cargo was to be submitted to the Spanish to confirm that 
proceeds arose only from the sale of Negroes. No Spanish passengers or their effects 
were to be transported on Asiento ships (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2769. L8-
17). 
 
The transport of articles other than slaves made smuggling possible (Coxe, 1846). 
Shortly after the Asiento treaty came into force the Spanish authorities provided the 
British with evidence of an escalating illicit trade involving SSC ships (Williams, 
1900). Although Spanish inspectors checked the SSC vessels before departure, 
auxiliary boats supplied them with contraband when they left port. Such incursions 
in Spanish markets would have serious consequences for that nation’s already 
depleted finances (Artola, 1982). In fact, the substantial illicit trade under the Asiento 
gave English commerce “its first large scale entry into the Spanish American field” 
and weakened Spanish economic dominance over its colonies (Aiton, 1928, p. 177). 
According to Nelson (1945, p. 55) the SSC’s smuggling “threatened to destroy the 
entire commercial framework of the Spanish Empire”. Contraband trade became a 
constant concern of the Spanish who invested heavily in naval protection. While this 
effectively diminished the profitability of the Asiento for the Spanish enhanced 
monitoring activity succeeded in detecting an increasing amount of smuggling 
(Bernal, 2001). 
 
Difficulties in operating the Asiento resulted in the conclusion of supplementary 
conventions and treaties in December 1715 and May 1716. These were confirmed by 
the Treaty of Madrid in June 1721 (General Collection of Treaties, 1732; Williams, 
1900; AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 1597 and 2776). In 1718 a declaration of 
war between England and Spain halted operations under the Asiento until 1721. 
Similar conflicts interrupted the contract from 1727 to 1729 and 1739 to 1748. 
During these crises the Spanish either confiscated or embargoed property of the SSC 
in the Indies. Accounts and records of these retaliatory actions, or Represalias 
(Reprisals), were maintained within Contaduría, the series of files containing details 
of financial transactions and other accounting related documents. The value attached 
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to these ‘revenges’ was a source of dispute between the Spanish government and the 
SSC. 
In summary, for the Spanish the Asiento facilitated the retention and exploitation of 
the Spanish empire in the Americas. For the British, in a mercantilist age “when 
almost every nation regarded its own dependencies as exclusive markets for the trade 
of the mother country” (Williams, 1900, p. 272), the Asiento conferred specific 
trading privileges that broke the monopoly of Spanish trade with its colonies (Aiton, 
1928). Such advantages proved “irreversible” and had a lasting influence on British-
Spanish relations during the eighteenth century (Lynch, 1999). Ultimately the award 
of the Asiento involved a transfer of political and commercial power from Spain to 
Britain and was consistent with British ambitions to extend trading and navigation in 
the Spanish Indies (Batchelor, 1925; Palacios Preciados, 1973).  
Accounting and compliance monitoring in the Asiento treaty  
 
Accounting was an important technique for monitoring British compliance with the 
Asiento treaty.vi
That the said Assientists are to give an account of their profits and gain at the end of the first five 
years of this Assiento, with accounts taken upon oath, and certified by legal instruments, of the charge 
of the purchase, subsistence, transportation, and sale of the negroes, and all other expences upon their 
account; and also certificates in due form, of the produce of their sale in all the ports and parts of 
America, belonging to his Catholic Majesty, whither they shall have been imported and sold; which 
accounts, as well of the charge as the produce, are first to be examined and settled, by her Brittanick 
Majesty’s ministers employed in this service, in regard to the share she is to have in this Assiento, and 
then to be examined in like manner in this court; and his Catholic Majesty’s share of the profits may 
be adjusted and recovered from the Assientists, who are obliged to pay the same most regularly and 
punctually…(Collection of all the Treaties, 1785). 
 The terms of the treaty relating to the rendering of accounts were 
taken from the preceding agreement between France and Spain. Article 29 of the 
Asiento Treaty between Britain and Spain stated: 
 
It was provided that the same reporting procedure might take place at subsequent 
five year intervals. At the end of the contract the Assientists were permitted three 
years to remove their effects from the Indies, adjust their accounts and “make up a 
balance of the whole” (Collection of all the Treaties, 1785; AGI. Indiferente 
General. Legajo 2785). The manner in which the monarchs were directly referred to 
in Article 29 is indicative of the importance attached by the Crowns to the 
accounting requirement. Particularly in the context of a commercial treaty 
accounting was perceived as a key device for reporting, verification and monitoring.  
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In addition to the submission of periodic accounts on-site monitoring and reporting 
was performed. Philip’s financial interest in the contract permitted his appointment 
of two representatives to watch over the SSC and interpose on his behalf in London 
(Scelle, 1910). Further, under the Asiento vessels delivering Negroes to Spanish 
ports in the Caribbean and Buenos Aires were to be visited by the resident governor 
and “searched to the bottom, even to the ballast” by Spanish officers (Collection of 
all the Treaties, 1785; AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2769, L8-22). The officer 
was to certify the cargo of slaves. Goods not for purposes of provisioning could be 
seized and burnt. The Spanish Crown expected to receive reports of the due 
performance of these controls. Here too, the submission of accounts was an 
important monitoring device (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2769, L8-29). For 
instance, in 1735 two British ships were held in port at Havana because the SSC 
factors there would not disclose the accounts (Hildner, 1938; AGI. Indiferente 
General. Legajo 2791). The English factor at the Havana factory, Woolley, 
eventually delivered the accounts and, as a result, the ships were permitted to sail 
(AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2812). 
 
The archives pertaining to the negotiations which preceded the treaty suggest that the 
accounting provisions were not controversial (see AGS. Est. Legajo 6896).vii 
However, it is clear that the two sides perceived the significance of these provisions 
differently. Given the commercial, financial and geo-political advantages offered by 
the Asiento treaty the accounting requirements may have appeared rather incidental 
to the British in 1713. By contrast, the less exuberant Spanish attached considerable 
importance to them and would be insistent about compliance. This should be 
understood in the context of depleted national finances, the potential threat the 
Asiento treaty posed to Spanish interests in the Americas, and an economy regulated 
by monopolies and royal concessions. A related factor is likely to have been the 
significance accorded to accounting prescriptions in the absolutist state. Spain had 
been the first country to require double-entry bookkeeping by royal decrees, in 1549 
(Cigales) and 1552 (Madrid). Some commentators contend that statutory compulsion 
reflected widespread use of the technique (Donoso, 1996, p. 120). Regulations on 
accounting became so voluminous that consolidation into a single instrument proved 
necessary in 1567 and required that “banks and currency exchangers as well as 
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merchants and any other people, both Spanish and foreigners, doing business either 
within or outside these kingdoms are obliged to keep records in Castillian language 
in their books of caxa and manual according to debit and credit” (Nueva 
Recopilación,  Libro IX, Título IV, Ley XII, 1567). During the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries, French influences furthered the centrality of accounting to 
business life. The Colbert Ordinances of 1673, which obliged French merchants to 
keep accounting books in a state which could be presented in the event of litigation, 
were mirrored in Spain by the Ordinances of Bilbao, 1737. 
 
Accounting was also much prescribed for state controlled organisations, which 
historically played a central role in the Spanish economy, often for the purpose of 
detecting and preventing fraud (Carmona & Donoso, 2004). In an early move to 
ensure the implementation of double-entry bookkeeping the Royal Treasury created 
professional accountants (Contador del Libro de Caxa de la Real Hacienda) who 
were obliged to report to the Board of Treasury (Carmona, Donoso & Ezzamel, 
2008). The importance attached to accounting was also evident in 1726 when the 
King approved the establishment of a single Treasury for the Spanish empire. This 
not only entailed the reorganization of the Treasury Department across the Spanish 
territories but also established extensive reporting procedures and redefined the role 
of treasury accountants (Pérez Fernández-Turégano, 2006). In this context, any 
failure by the British to comply with the accounting requirements of the Asiento 
treaty was likely to attract considerable attention in Spanish quarters.    
Noncompliance with the terms of the Asiento treaty  
Soon after the Asiento commenced the Spanish formed the view that the SSC lacked 
any genuine intent to render accounts of its commercial activities under the treaty. 
By the time the SSC resumed the Asiento after the war between Britain and Spain 
from 1718 to 1722, it had failed to comply with the reporting provisions of the treaty 
or to remit any payments relating to the first five-years of the contract. It had also 
failed to submit the accounts of two annual ships which sailed in 1717 and 1721 
having been given permission by Philip V to trade in the Spanish Indies (see 
Donoso, 2002). The reason for noncompliance on the British side was the self-
interested pursuit of material and strategic gain. The cost of compliance was too 
high; the benefits of cheating substantial.  
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Noncompliance and the pursuit of self interest by the SSC 
 
As had been the case with previous Assientists, legitimate trading under the Asiento 
was soon discovered by the SSC to be less remunerative than expected (Carswell, 
1960, pp. 65-67; Thomas, 1998, p. 233). When profits appeared to be earned from 
supplying slaves they were often eroded by substantial bad debts arising from credit 
transactions with colonists (Palmer, 1981, pp. 145-155). Carrying illicit cargoes was 
more attractive (McLachlan, 1940, pp. 59-64). The supply of Negroes offered the 
British “a screen behind which to import forbidden commodities into the Spanish 
colonies” (Nelson, 1945, p. 55; Laughton, 1889; Scelle, 1910). Conformity to the 
accounting and reporting obligations of the treaty would have rendered such activity 
transparent. Whereas the public accounts of the SSC revealed that the Asiento (if not 
the annual ships) was loss making (McLachlan, 1940, pp. 129-130), the secret books 
of its sub-governor would have shown to the Spanish that the officers of the SSC 
were making substantial profits - £600,000 in the period immediately before the 
outbreak of war in 1739 (Aiton, 1928). The books would also have indicated that, 
under the cover of permission to supply provisions for slaves, crew and factories, the 
fortune-seeking officers of the SSC were exporting illicit goods to the Indies and 
importing contraband to Europe whenever the opportunity presented itself (Aiton, 
1928). Using the secret account books of the sub-governor, Nelson (1945) estimated 
that illegal imports into the Spanish Indies on Negro ships amounted to at least £5m 
from 1730 to 1739 and £0.5m from the two annual ships permitted during those 
years. The interests requiring protection also went beyond the officers of the SSC. 
According to Scelle (1910, p. 656) the considerable “private profits” earned “were 
distributed throughout the whole English nation: London commerce shared in the 
whole of it”. Hence, while the Spanish insisted on strict adherence to the accounting 
and inspection provisions of the treaty, the English were equally determined to 
obfuscate or ignore them.  
The Spanish insistence on compliance became more determined as evidence mounted 
that the supply of slaves and the annual ship were a veil behind which the SSC was 
conducting illicit trade, and that the true accounts of the operation were being hidden 
from them. According to Bolingbroke, a director of the SSC, the firm was launched to 
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become “a shelter to cover up illicit trade” (see Thomas, 1998, p. 237). Two forms of 
illicit trade were performed in relation to the Asiento (i) smuggling was conducted by 
the SSC and recorded in its secret accounts,viii
In the absence of transparency and given the damage done to their mercantile 
interests the Spanish went to considerable lengths to capture accounting information. 
Accounts were sought, for example, on the smuggling of flour (see AGI. Indiferente 
General. Legajo 2802) and of boats carrying illegal cargo (see AGI. Indiferente 
General. Legajo 2791). There are references in British state papers to the Spanish 
actually seizing SSC accounting books (SP94/106, 9.3.1732) but no such books 
survive in the Spanish archives and there are no indications in the sources of either 
side that Spanish representatives used the contents of seized accounts in bilateral 
negotiations. At the same time, the British were anxious that accounting records did 
not end up in the possession of their treaty partners. For example in May 1722 the 
Board of Blacks (Junta de Negros) in Spain observed that at the outbreak of war in 
1718 the SSC’s factor in Cartagena had sent the account books of his establishment to 
Jamaica to prevent them from falling into Spanish hands (AGI. Indiferente. 2801).  
 and (ii) contraband trade was 
conducted by the captains of the ships chartered by the SSC to carry slaves and 
merchandise. From the SSC perspective, the latter form of smuggling was deemed 
“very damaging for the interests of the company” (Thomas, 1998, p. 238) and it made 
every effort to discourage it (Palmer, 1981, p. 13). As far as the Spanish were 
concerned these forms of smuggling were indistinguishable.  
The SSC continually evaded the requirement to supply five-yearly accounts under 
the Asiento. In 1725, the King of Spain appointed a board of two accountants to 
investigate the Royal Treasury’s claim for 800,000 silver pesos escudos from the 
SSC under the treaty. The accountants approached Sir Francis Stratford, 
representative of the SSC at the Spanish Court and demanded the company’s 
accounts. In response Sir Francis provided the accountants with a large number of 
vouchers which they subsequently deemed incomplete and inaccurate. In January 
1726, Guillermo Eon, remitted to watch over Philip’s interest in the SSC, made an 
unsuccessful attempt to secure the required information from the company’s 
headquarters (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2769. L8-Images 654-656). This 
motivated a more formal request that the SSC “should report its accounts in due 
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course, by virtue of their obligation to do so every five years, as it is written in 
condition 29 of the Asiento”. In the meantime, the Spanish authorities insisted that 
Sir Francis ensure that the SSC submit full accounts. He responded that his directors 
in London were “working on the completion of those accounts” (AGI. Indiferente 
General, 2769. L8) but having failed to supply them, on 28 May 1727, Sir Francis 
was placed under arrest in Madrid (Letter of the Council to Sir Antonio Jose de 
Cepeda. AGI. Indiferente General 2769. L8).  
 
Important evidence of noncompliance was subsequently made available to the 
Spanish in 1728-1729 by two officers of the SSC in return for protection and 
pensions. These were Matthew Plowes, Secretary and Principal Accountant of the 
SSC in London and John Burnet, a factor for fifteen years at Portobello and 
Cartagena (Brown, 1926). Plowes supplied 42 documents to the Spanish including 
financial statements of the SSC. Plowes also prepared a signed submission indicating 
that the SSC thwarted the terms of the Asiento. Illicit trading by the SSC was 
eventually recorded in the company’s secret accounts. Further, senior officials of the 
SSC conducted the illicit trade for their personal gain. Plowes testified that on their 
outward voyages all annual ships to date and many of the Negro transports had 
carried contraband goods in addition to legitimate cargo. The ships returned laden 
with silver on which duty was not being paid to Spain, as well as Spanish passengers 
who were a conduit for carrying the same. Burnet provided evidence of the 
numerous devices employed by the SSC (such as false measurements and 
inventories, hiding cargo, sending supplementary vessels and bribing officials) 
which showed that the Asiento and annual ship were a cover for flooding the Spanish 
Indies with cheap English goods through the factories established for the distribution 
of slaves (Brown, 1926; Pares, 1936, pp. 20-22). 
 
Increasing knowledge of illicit trading by the SSC resulted in the Spanish tightening 
on-site monitoring in the Americas during the 1730s. The Spanish Treasury also 
recognised that controls had been applied loosely by its own bureaucrats. Two 
responses are worthy of note. First, the Asiento provided for the appointment of 
Spanish managers who would liaise with British factors and others over purchases 
and accounts with a view to avoiding and resolving disputes. The Spanish managers 
were also to oversee compliance with treaty obligations on site. In order to address 
 24 
suspected abuses by the SSC and improve reporting to his Catholic Majesty the 
Spanish (despite British objections) appointed a factor in each of the ports that 
received shipments from the SSC (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2851).ix
 
  
Second, following the receipt of clear evidence of illicit trade from Plowes and 
Burnet in the late 1720s, the Spanish Minister of Finance appointed Tomás 
Geraldino as representative at the SSC’s headquarters in London in April 1732 (AGI. 
Indiferente General. Legajo 2785). Geraldino was given instructions to deter 
contraband trade and improve monitoring of the SSC (AGI. Indiferente General. 
Legajo 2786). In particular, he was asked to carefully review the cargo of annual 
ships, and report on the condition of the vessels used and the expenses incurred by 
the SSC in providing the ship with rigging, equipment, provisions and sails. 
Geraldino was also requested to check the prices of each item included in the cargo 
and ensure that it derived from Great Britain, per the Treaty of Utrecht. The loading 
of cargo on the vessel was to be checked to corresponding invoices and these were to 
be posted to the Spanish Treasury. Geraldino was also to request from the SSC 
original invoices of the cargos of each annual ship in the past and details of 
merchandise traded. 
 
Although he was a salaried member of the Court of Directors of the SSC, the 
financial accounts and reports revealing the true state of the operation of the Asiento 
were hidden from Geraldino. In mid-1730 the company remitted the conduct of 
important matters to its sub and deputy governors. This provided a vehicle for 
concealing much from Geraldino: 
 
If it were the intention of the Spanish court to have a friend in the enemy’s camp, it was deceived as 
nothing but routine matters were placed before the court in Geraldino’s presence. The real center of 
the Asiento regulation, where the secrets of the Company were laid bare, was the sub-governor’s 
office. There, Peter Burrell [sub-governor and MP] and his coterie made the important decisions as to 
policy and read the confidential despatches of the Company agents (Aiton, 1928, p. 168; Nelson, 
1945). 
 
Noncompliance and the pursuit of self-interest by Spain 
 
There was another dimension to the pursuit of gain in addition to British 
noncompliance with the accounting provisions of the Asiento treaty. The Spanish 
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also displayed behaviour suggestive of the primacy of self-interest, at the level of the 
individual and the state.  
 
Treaty violation by the SSC was facilitated by the pursuit of personal advantage by 
some Spanish officials who, charged with compliance monitoring, were successfully 
corrupted by the British. Indeed the SSC set aside monies to provide regalos, or 
‘gifts’ for officials. Palmer (1981, p. 73, also pp. 86-88) has contended that “Every 
crown employee who had been involved in any way in the clearance of a vessel 
expected a bribe: the chief royal official at the port… the accountant, the writer, and 
the lawyer”. The documents supplied by Plowes and Burnet in 1728-1729 identified 
the names of Spanish officials in the Indies who accepted bribes to allow the import 
of contraband. They also indicated that Guillermo Eon, Philip’s representative at the 
SSC from 1717, who had seemingly attempted to control illicit trade (AGI. 
Indiferente General. Legajo 2776), was actually receiving an annual salary from the 
SSC of £800 and occasional bonuses of £1,000, for turning a blind eye to false 
measurements on the annual ships and other frauds by the SSC (Brown, 1926; 
Nelson, 1945; Batchelor, 1925; Temperley, 1909; Thomas, 1998, p. 237).  
 
At a national level, in the face of the increasing evidence of the damage being done 
to Spanish commercial and strategic interests, the British were suspicious that 
Spain’s responses to noncompliance were devices calculated to encourage the British 
to give up the Asiento contract rather than enforce or persuade them to comply. 
There is some evidence to support the SSC’s suspicions that the Spanish behaved in 
ways to achieve this end (SP36/35, 15.5.1735). For example, following a request 
from Philip V, Johann Wilhelm, Baron of Ripperdá, issued a report in November 
1724 on the state of the Spanish economy (Coxe, 1846, Volume II, pp. 365-370). 
Ripperdá argued that although cancellation of the Asiento by Spain was impossible, 
measures should be taken to ensure strict compliance by Britain with the clauses of 
the treaty. This, Ripperdá contended, would provoke British withdrawal from the 
Asiento. He also suggested granting navigation permits late so that British vessels 
would arrive in Spanish ports when commercial fairs (at which goods were sold) 
were well under way and indicated that secret orders should be forwarded to Spanish 
governors advising a boycott of British produce as well as enforcement of 
continuous inspections of merchants selling SSC products.  
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Benjamin Keene, British Ambassador to Madrid was also to observe that the 
principal object of Don Josef Patiño, the powerful minister who controlled Spanish 
finances, was the destruction of the Asiento trade (Williams, 1901; McLachlan, 
1940, pp. 146-154; Coxe, 1846, Volume III, p. 127). Taking advantage of doubts 
among its shareholders (if not the directors) about the profitability of the contract 
and its frequent disruption (McLachlan, 1940, pp. 122-131), formal attempts to 
secure the SSC’s withdrawal from all or parts of the Asiento treaty were set in train 
by the Spanish during the 1730s but the British government was reluctant to accede 
(McLachlan, 1940, pp. 125-126).x
 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that the SSC were failing to comply with the 
accounting (and some other) provisions of the Asiento treaty. The Spanish were 
cognisant of this and sought greater informational transparency by appointing factors 
in each port and placing their own representative at the SSC. It is also likely that the 
Spanish exploited the SSC’s noncompliance in ways designed to further their own 
interest in encouraging British withdrawal from the treaty. In addition to these 
essentially unilateral responses, structures and mechanisms were deployed in the 
international arena to address and manage noncompliance. These institutional 
responses are the subjects of the following sections. 
 
 
The management of noncompliance – accounting and the Treaty of Seville 
Commission  
 
It will be recalled that adherents to the managerialist approach to understanding 
treaty behaviour contend that noncompliance seldom arises from intentional 
violation. Rather it is a consequence of ambiguity in the treaty, impediments to the 
capacity of a state to comply or uncontrollable changes which have emerged since 
the agreement was signed. Managerialists contend that given the propensity of states 
to adhere to treaties the causes of noncompliance are best remedied through the 
routines of international politics as opposed to punitive enforcement mechanisms. 
Conversely, realists argue that noncompliance will persist while it remains in a 
state’s interest to do so, irrespective of institutional structures designed to address the 
causes of violation or resolve disputes between treaty signatories. Further, attempts 
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to manage noncompliance can provide additional opportunities for self-interested 
states to pursue gains.  
 
In the case of the Asiento it will be shown that realist self-interest dominated treaty 
behaviour and that in this context the establishment of structures to manage 
noncompliance provided scope for further avoidance of obligations. Although the 
SSC often argued that noncompliance with accounting provisions was a consequence 
of incapacity borne of the Spanish seizure of records and disruptions to trade during 
wartime, the preservation of material gains evidently dictated its behaviour. Rather 
than being a legitimate basis for noncompliance, incapacity was used as a 
smokescreen behind which self-interested objects were pursued. Palmer (1981, p. 
145) has asserted that while “[t]he company did not always know the truth about its 
operations…there is reason to believe that sometimes it deliberately misrepresented 
the state of affairs”. 
   
The war between Spain and England of 1728 resulted in a temporary abatement of 
Spanish demands for the SSC to render five-yearly accounts of the Asiento. The 
Treaty of Seville, 1729 restored commercial relations between England and Spain to 
those which prevailed in 1725 (Williams, 1901). This included the resumption of the 
Asiento. In order to resolve disputes between the two nations the Treaty of Seville 
provided that the crowns would appoint commissaries for the purpose of addressing 
alleged commercial abuses, seizures of ships and other grievances founded on 
treaties (A Collections of Treaties, 1785, Vol. 2). The commissaries were to meet at 
the Court of Spain within four months of the ratification of the treaty. 
 
Although the Treaty of Seville was signed on 9 November 1729, the three British 
commissaries only arrived at the Spanish Court in December 1730. Due to 
complications over the execution of the treaty in Spain, the three Spanish 
commissaries were not appointed until one year later. The Commissaries held their 
first substantive meeting on 3 March 1732 (SP94/106). Armed with evidence from 
Plowes and Burnet, and aware of the illicit trade conducted by the SSC, the Spanish 
commissaries submitted a paper which insisted that before any other business could 
be prosecuted Spain required compliance with two elements of the Asiento 
(Béthencourt Massieu, 1998, p. 194; AHN, Est. Legs. 3365 at. 35). First, under the 
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2nd article the King of Spain was to be paid duties by the SSC on the import of 
Negroes. Second, under the 29th article the SSC was to submit their accounts 
relating to the first five years of the Asiento. To date no such accounts had been 
received in Spain.  
 
Through March 1732 the Spanish commissaries were insistent that these issues be 
addressed and threatened adjournment if they were not. The British commissaries 
responded that the accounts were expected but warned that they were unlikely to be 
“very correct” due to the disruption of trade and “the Imprisonment of their Factors, 
Seizure of their Books, Effects &c” (SP94/106, 9.3.1732). The Spanish agreed to 
accept the accounts “in the best manner they could be given” but insisted that a time 
limit be set for their delivery. The Spanish reasserted that until they were satisfied on 
this issue and the payment of duties on slaves, they would not proceed to discuss 
other claims (AGS. Est. Legajos 6882 and 6883; SP94/106, 13.3.1732).  
 
So far as the Spanish were concerned their right to receive accounts every five years 
under the Asiento treaty was “not liable to any doubt or controversy”. Further they 
laid “The greatest stress upon the Speedy Examination of them” and could not 
comprehend why, given the importance they attached to this issue and the 
subsequent work of the commission, their production by the SSC had been deferred 
for so long (SP94/106, 10.3.1732). By the end of March 1732 it was agreed that the 
payment of full duties on Blacks would be computed from 1730 and within four 
months the SSC “shall deliver all the other Accounts they are obliged to render in 
consequence of the Assiento contract” (SP94/106, 27.3.1732).  
 
The British commissaries requested the SSC to submit the accounts and vouchers as 
soon as possible and asserted that their failure to do so was preventing discussion of 
other issues (ibid., 21.3.1732; AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2809). The 
commissaries requested the Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, to press the 
officers of the SSC to comply with accounting requirements, adding that the Spanish 
“have that affair so much at heart, we do not believe we shall find them enter upon 
any other, with a favourable disposition ‘till we are enabled to satisfy them in this 
particular” (SP94/106, 27.3.1732). On 28 March the British commissaries reported 
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to the SSC that the Spanish would accept accounts prepared to the last rupture in 
trade (SP94/106, 27.3.1732). 
 
Meanwhile, the British commissaries set about preparing their lists of more 
substantive grievances relating to Spanish seizures of goods and ships and other 
interferences with merchants and their trade. The Spanish responded by drawing up 
their own list of demands, the first of which was further accounting, the submission 
of vouchers to support the accounts to be delivered by the SSC: “1. Having allready 
agreed upon the Delivery of all the Accounts to be given by the Company, His 
Majesty insists, that all Actions, Titles and Rights relating to those Accounts, and 
that may appear upon the Inspection of them, shall be previously Examined and 
Discussed” (SP94/106, 17.4.1732). The Spanish then proceeded to seek recompense 
for clandestine trade carried on by the SSC and others under the veil of the supply of 
Negroes and the annual ship. They sought the submission of accounts and other 
documents to establish the value of that trade (SP94/106, 17.4.1732).   
 
In June 1732 the British commissaries wrote to the SSC to remind them that the 
accounts were urgently expected and that financial statements which were not “very 
correct” would be acceptable given that their accuracy was compromised by the 
interruption of trade. It was considered that the submission of accounts could be to 
the SSC’s advantage. Not only might they reveal to the Spanish the “great 
hardships” which the company had suffered but once a just balance had been struck 
the Company’s trade could proceed without impediment. Most importantly, the SSC 
was reminded that there was no prospect of rendering the Spanish more receptive to 
the Company’s demands concerning the Asiento “till their Accounts are here and laid 
before them” (SP94/106, 6.6.1732).   
 
The deadline for the submission of accounts passed on 1 August 1732 without a 
response from the SSC. The British commissaries feared that the failure to deliver 
them would be used by the Spanish as reason for not discussing other matters 
(SP94/106, 19.8.1732; AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2785). They urged 
Secretary of State Newcastle to intervene and at the end of August he accordingly 
wrote to the SSC encouraging their submission (SP36/35, 5.9.1732). Although 
relations between the Spanish and British commissaries in Seville were described as 
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cordial the failure of the SSC to submit accounts began to frustrate the business of 
the commission. Following a meeting on 4 September 1732 the British reported: 
 
…the South Sea Company’s Accounts were demanded from us, in such a manner that Mr Keene 
himself, I am persuaded, begins to apprehend our Conferences will be very soon suspended, and until 
we produce them, except Mr Patiño can be prevailed upon to Order the Spanish Commissaries to 
proceed  (SP94/106, 4.9.1732).   
 
It was not until 5 September 1732 that the SSC responded to Newcastle and the 
commissaries’ requests to deliver the accounts. The delay was explained as a 
consequence of the company being occupied for several months with “uncommon 
business” (SP36/35, 5.9.1732). Although the deadline for the supply of accounts was 
passed, the company craved more time on grounds that it had proved difficult to 
prepare them due to the seizure of vessels and company property by the Spanish 
(including books and papers) in 1718 and 1727 (AGS. Est. Legajo 895). Although 
some of the accounts were now ready it was stated that “we have not been very 
forward to send them, being willing to take all the time we can to make them up with 
as much Correction and Exactness as possible” (SP36/35, 5.9.1732). Hence, the SSC 
requested further time for delivery. The company also expressed surprise that delays 
in submitting accounts should retard the proceedings of the commission because the 
discussion of other grievances were independent of them. In fact the SSC suspected 
that the Spanish demand for the accounts was diversionary and confirmation of their 
faint hopes of any redress from the work of the commission. In the opinion of the 
SSC the willingness of the Spanish to receive accounts which were less than perfect 
indicated that an ingenious ruse was afoot: “We do not doubt your zealous 
endeavour to adjust our affairs according to Justice & Equity, but Evidently perceive 
the Spanish Commissarys have no such Intention, and that you will be Teaz’d with 
Artful and dilatory disputes” (SP36/35, 5.9.1732). 
 
Some respite from demands to supply accounts was provided in autumn 1732 
because the Spanish commissaries were awaiting further instructions from their 
finance minister, Patiño (SP94/106, 28.11.1732). Efforts appear to have been made 
in London to produce the accounts in the expectation that Patiño “will be for having 
these embroiled Accounts adjusted where he can finger the most money” (SP94/106, 
28.11.1732). By February 1733 the British commissaries reported the receipt of 
accounts from the SSC, “incorrect as they are”, and noted that supporting vouchers 
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were soon expected for presentation to the Spanish (AGI. Sección de Contaduría. 
266). However, much remained unknown: “We have not the General Account with 
His Catholick Majesty, nor the Account of the Negro Trade, in which his said 
Majesty is One Fourth part concerned and whereby many think the loss must be 
considerable” (SP94/106, 17.2.1733). 
 
The accounts submitted thus far focussed on seizures of SSC property by the Spanish 
to the value of three million dollars, plus interest. The British commissaries 
contrasted this revelation with the heavy complaints by the Spanish about the 
insufficient supply of slaves and the conduct of a substantial illicit trade by the SSC. 
It was noted that if the accounts of such losses had been available at the outset of the 
Seville commission fewer concessions would have been granted to the Spanish on 
issues such as the duties on Negroes (SP94/106, 17.2.1733).  
 
Although it was not formally disbanded the work of the commission abated in 
February 1733 when the Spanish Court moved from Seville to Madrid (Hildner, 
1938). The dispute over the settling of the five-year accounts of the Asiento was not 
resolved. In the remainder of 1733 reference was made in correspondence to the 
frustration of further work by the commission due to the confused accounts of the 
SSC (SP94/106, 9.6.1733). During 1733 Tomás Geraldino, the Spanish 
representative on the Board of the SSC, was informed that the preparation of 
accounts in a form consistent with the requirements of the Asiento Treaty was not 
possible (AGI. Indiferente General, 2790). In relation to the first period of the 
Asiento, John Reed, the Accountant of the SSC, claimed that factors had not 
submitted diaries or ledgers until November 1719 (AGI. Sección de Contaduría. 
266). The SSC attributed a lack of earlier accounting records to the seizure of a 
vessel by the Spanish during the war of 1718-1722 which was carrying the accounts 
of the factories (AGI. Sección de Contaduría. 895). The SSC therefore argued that it 
would have to reconstruct transactions from other documentation and interviews.  
 
Geraldino then proposed that the accounts be reconstructed from information 
contained in the SSCs “Cash and Entry Book” (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 
2790) and on 3 March 1734 Reed handed to Geraldino the accounts corresponding to 
the first five years of the Asiento (which actually covered 1714-1721 because of war 
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between Britain and Spain) (Donoso, 2002; AGI. Indiferente General, 2790).  A 
translated version of the ‘Statement of Accounts’ was sent to the Accounting Office 
of the Ministry of Treasury in Madrid. Having examined the documents, the Spanish 
accountants identified numerous objections and proposed that the accounts of the 
SSC for the period May 1713-March 1721 be rejected as unverifiable and 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Asiento treaty (Donoso, 2002). The Spanish 
demanded that the SSC prepare accounts which were consistent with the treaty and 
in a form conventionally supplied by companies. They would not pass simple cash 
accounts merely to facilitate the speedy resolution of disputes (SP94/131). 
 
In April 1734 Ambassador Keene, who, as mentioned above, also acted as an agent 
for the SSC, provided the Spanish representative with a financial summary of the 
trade in Negroes for the period 1 May 1714 to 31 March 1721 (AGI. Indiferente 
General. Legajo 2814). According to this summary, the SSC incurred expenditure of 
£546,786.17.11 arising from the purchasing, feeding and other costs of supplying 
slaves. Yet, the SSC could only generate revenue of £334,515.8.3 from their sale. 
Therefore there was a £212,515.9.8 lossxi
 
 from the trade in Negroes (AGI, 
Indiferente General. Legajo 2786 and 2792). 
Concluding the accounts of the SSC proved difficult and protracted. In November 
1734 the British commissaries expressed their low expectations that agreement could 
be reached with the Spanish over this and other matters (SP94/106, 5.11.1734). The 
British failed to secure redress for Spanish ship seizures and impediments to trade. 
The Spanish complained about the failure to adjust the affairs of the SSC and the 
illicit trade it conducted (SP94/106, 5.12.1734). The British commissaries had been 
in Spain for three years “without being able to come to any Determination upon the 
Respective pretensions, which, we were given to understand, proceeded principally 
from the Difficulties that arose with regard to the South Sea Company’s Accounts” 
(SP94/106, 5.12.1734).  
 
Given that the SSC’s accounts had not been kept “with any tolerable Correctness”, 
allegedly due to the ruptures to the Asiento trade, Spanish requests for further 
evidence and clarification met with delayed responses from London. Although it was 
recognised that Patiño “desires nothing so much as the Settling the Accounts of the 
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South Sea Company, and the Regulating of the Commerce of the West Indies” 
(SP94/106, 5.12.1734) there were “daily” disputes over the accounts between the 
SSC and Tomás Geraldino. Given the centrality of the accounting issue to Anglo-
Spanish relations the British commissaries suggested that the commission be moved 
from Spain to London, to be closer to the SSC’s records. It was agreed by Newcastle 
in Whitehall that this should be put to the Spanish as the most speedy and effective 
way to “settle the several points which remain unadjusted” (SP94/124, 24.2.1735). 
However, the proposal was not taken up. 
 
Unresolved conflicts over the SSC’s failure to submit periodic financial statements 
under the Asiento treaty were not the only source of dispute between Britain and 
Spain which focused on informational transparency and reporting through the 
medium of accounting. 
The management of treaty ambiguity – accounting and the annual ship  
For managerialists ambiguity and indeterminate language in treaties are important 
explanations for noncompliance which are not suggestive of intentional violation. 
Such issues arise because: 
Treaties, like other formal statements of legal rules, frequently do not provide determinate answers to 
specific disputed questions. Language is unable to capture meaning with precision. Drafters do not 
foresee many of the possible applications, let alone their contextual settings. Issues actually foreseen 
often cannot be resolved at the time of treaty negotiation and are swept under the rug with a formula 
that can mean what each party wants it to (Chayes & Chayes, 1995, p. 10).  
 
Managerialists contend that such causes of noncompliance are best addressed by 
deploying “routine international political processes” of persuasion and dispute 
settlement (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 204).  
 
There was a particular accounting-related source of indeterminacy in the Asiento 
treaty. Although the treaty obliged the Assientists to submit accounts of the gains 
earned at the end of five years and established the entitlement of the King of Spain to 
a share of the profits of the annual ship, there was no specific mention of accounting 
and reporting in relation to the latter. Archival sources suggest no consideration of 
this subject during the negotiations leading to the signing of the Asiento treaty (AGI. 
Indiferente General. Legajo 2773). This is surprising given the recognition that trade 
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in merchandise rather than the supply of slaves was expected to provide the main 
source of profits for the Assientists (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo, 2773). 
 
Much discord was to centre on accounting for, and distributing the profits of, the 
annual ship. Attempts to resolve this source of treaty ambiguity and resultant conflict 
were conducted through direct negotiation and indirect exchanges between British 
and Spanish diplomats and politicians. These processes proved to be inadequate 
mechanisms for managing alleged treaty noncompliance in a context where 
behaviour was driven by a realist pursuit of self-interest. It was to the material 
advantage of the SSC to exploit indeterminacy over the presentation of accounts of 
the annual ship. Concession and greater transparency would have revealed the 
company’s involvement in illicit activity and also form the basis for calculating 
profits to be remitted to the Spanish Crown.  
 
As related earlier, the Asiento provided that the SSC could send an annual vessel to 
trade in the Spanish Indies. This was compensation for the expected losses arising 
from trade in Negroes. The first ship to head for the Americas, the Royal Prince, was 
scheduled for 1714 but delayed until 1717 (AGI. Indiferente General 2769, L8, 
Picture 351). In May 1716 a Convention for Explaining the Articles of Assiento 
Treaty had been signed which contained clauses relevant to the annual ship (A 
General Collection of Treaties, 1732; Tratado de la Declaración; AGI. Indiferente 
General 2785). It was agreed that strictures concerning the sale of merchandise 
transported by annual ships at appointed trade fairs would be relaxed (AGI. 
Indiferente General 2769 L9) and the cargo of the next ten annual ships would be 
650 tons each. In fact, only seven annual ships sailed during the period of the 
Asiento, the last being the Royal Caroline in 1732. In contrast to the legitimate trade 
in Negroes, the annual ships did generate healthy returns, in some cases profits were 
in excess of 100% (McLachlan, 1940, pp. 130-131). When accounts of the Royal 
Prince’s voyage in 1717 were finally made up in late 1733 they showed reported 
profits of £43,607 (AGI. Sección Contaduría. 266, Legajo 3). After deducting 
interest on the loan granted by the SSC to the King of Spain, the Spanish 
claimed £8,678, but this was never received.  
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The submission of accounts of the profits earned by annual ships became an ongoing 
source of dispute. The Prince William sailed to Portobello in 1730. In 1732 one 
stockholder claimed that £200,000 of the return cargo of this vessel derived from 
illegal trade (Nelson, 1945) and in February 1733 the Spanish demanded the 
accounts of the voyage. In the absence of an unambiguous obligation under the 
Asiento treaty to report the British suggested that the SSC exploit the opportunity by 
preparing an account to highlight the impediments to trade imposed by the Spanish. 
The account might show the share of profits due to the Spanish less the proceeds of 
goods which had been embargoed by them and be accompanied by an insistence that 
the company’s effects be “disembarrassed” before any payment was made 
(SP94/106, 17.2.1733). Despite such diversionary tactics public accusations of 
illegal trading in Britain provided ammunition to the Spanish and following 
Geraldino’s protestations the captain of the Prince William was dismissed. 
 
The last annual ship sent by the SSC was the Royal Caroline which sailed to 
Veracruz. The loading of the vessel commenced in August 1732 and was closely 
monitored by the Spanish. Geraldino complained to the SSC that contrary to the 
Treaty of Utrecht some merchandise derived from countries other than Great Britain. 
The SSC responded that such merchandise had been loaded on previous annual ships 
without complaint (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2786). Geraldino relented. 
However, he requested copies of invoices relating to the goods carried and these 
were forwarded to the Spanish manager in Veracruz with a view to thoroughly 
scrutinising the sale of the cargo. Two of Geraldino’s officers also guarded the cargo 
during the voyage (Batchelor, 1925). 
 
The Royal Caroline arrived in Veracruz on 25 December 1732 and was inspected by 
the governor, royal officers and the Spanish factor, Juan de Ávila (AGI. Indiferente 
General. Legajo 2786). During the inspection the Spanish complained about the 
large amount of provisions, supposedly for consumption by the crew during 
their eight to ten month stay in Veracruz. The Spanish argued that the provisions 
were carried for the purpose of smuggling. The cargo of the Royal Caroline 
delivered in Veracruz comprised wool, linen, silk, and other merchandise (AGI. 
Indiferente General. Report of Juan de Ávila. 15 November 1733). Ávila reported to 
the Spanish Minister of Treasury that officers of the Royal Caroline had not properly 
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accounted for expenses incurred during the winter (invernada) in Veracruz (AGI, 
Indiferente General. Legajo 2786 and 2789). Furthermore, there was no documentary 
support for, or proper accounting of, some items of cargo. It was difficult to identify 
from the books of account which items represented expenses of the voyage (to be 
deducted from income) and which were cargo for trade.  
 
Despite these difficulties Ávila used data delivered by officers of the Royal Caroline 
to reconstruct the value of the cargo carried to Veracruz (AGI. Sección de 
Contaduría. 266, Legajo 4). Calculations of profit and loss were supported by the 
invoices of cargo transported to Veracruz, returns (retornos – an inventory of items 
transported back to London), and available accounts of the SSC (which provided the 
debit for expenses incurred on the voyage). The profit and loss account consisted of 
a number of items. First, the cost of the cargo transported to Veracruz was 
£214,017.2.3, or 1,070,085 Pesos, 4 reales and 6 granos.xii
 
 Second, sale of the cargo 
to two Spanish merchants for 1,554,579 Pesos and 7½ Reales, that is, £349,778.9.12. 
Importantly, and for reasons which are not known, Ávila did not consider the cost of 
merchandise in the net income calculation of the voyage to Veracruz. However, with 
the consent of the British, he recorded £180,814.13.7. Lastly, after admitting some 
expenses incurred by the SSC and recorded in its accounts, Ávila reported a profit of 
384,000 Pesos (£76,800) for the voyage. 
The Royal Caroline departed Veracruz on 17 November 1733 laden with Spanish 
and English currencies, silver, indigo ink and grain. The ship reached Dover on 6 
January 1734 and docked in London three days later. Geraldino issued a report to the 
Spanish Minister of Treasury on 14 January and copied it to the Court of the SSC. In 
this Geraldino complained that information about the Royal Caroline had been 
withheld. He had been handed relevant documents during a general assembly of the 
SSC, not on the arrival of the vessel. In a private letter to the Spanish Ministry of 
Treasury, Geraldino expressed his suspicion that such manoeuvres were an attempt 
to hide the fact that a portion of the cargo belonged to private individuals. He also 
reported having received word that a substantial amount of silver had been smuggled 
on the ship. Ávila had warned him that “at the time of loading the vessel with fifty 
five barrels of salted meat as provision for the crew, we found a number of silver 
bars that were deposited in our royal lockers and weighed five hundred and nineteen 
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marcos” (AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2789). Geraldino added that this illegal 
trading in silver was consented to by the British government on grounds of its 
“national benefits” (AGI.  Indiferente General. Legajo 2790). 
 
On 13 and 28 March 1735 Geraldino requested the Court of Directors of the SSC to 
supply the accounts of the Royal Caroline, pay one quarter of the profits of the 
venture plus 5% duty on three quarters of the cargo, as required under the Asiento 
treaty. The SSC referred the request to a committee which reported on 1 May that the 
accounts of the annual ship should be submitted jointly with the five-yearly accounts 
of the Asiento, next due on 1 January 1736. Geraldino then presented a third demand 
for the accounts and the payment of profits of the Royal Caroline. The committee of 
the SSC responded on 9 May 1735. It had resolved that: i) Geraldino’s first demand 
for accounts was received when much of the cargo remained unsold and an exact 
account could therefore not be rendered at that time; ii) although the cargo was now 
sold, there was no provision in the Asiento treaty which stipulated “the Time or 
manner of rendering the Accounts of Annual ships” (SP36/37, 4.12.1735); iii) the 
articles of the treaty stated that accounts of the Asiento were to be submitted every 
five years and in the absence of a specific provision relating to the accounts of the 
annual ship, this implied a five-year accounting period for both; iv) as the treaty 
recognised that the annual ship was permitted as compensation for likely losses from 
the supply of Negroes, profits from the ship should be retained until the extent of 
those losses were known and the two matters settled at once; and, v) the payment to 
Spain of a share of the profits following the voyage of the Prince William to 
Portobello in 1730 did not constitute a precedent.  
 
The Spanish ministers considered these arguments to be baseless. Their frustration 
was made clear in a letter by Patiño to Keene on 7 August. Patiño, who was to later 
assert that contraband of £150,000 was carried on the Royal Caroline (Nelson, 
1945), noted that despite repeated requests from Geraldino “grounded upon the 
strongest and most convincing arguments”, the SSC remained determined not to 
submit an account of the Royal Caroline or to remit the share of the profits due to 
Spain (SP94/123, 7.8.1735). It was noted that King Philip had “been informed of the 
groundless pretexts by which the Company endeavour to exempt themselves of the 
obligation of finishing these accompts” and urged the British Court to issue direct 
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orders to secure compliance as soon as possible (SP94/123, 7.8.1735). Further, it was 
argued that the Asiento treaty offered no power “to blend the accompts of the Negro 
trade with those of the annual ship”. These trades were quite distinctive, one being a 
long term arrangement and accounted for accordingly, the other relating to individual 
ventures to be accounted for separately. It was also argued that the SSC had 
complied in the case of the Prince William and while there might be reasons for the 
delay in submitting five yearly accounts of the Asiento there should be no such delay 
in relation to the accounts of a single venture. The Spanish also noted that it was 
known that the SSC maintained a separate fund and account for each annual ship 
(SP94/123, 7.8.1735).  
 
Keene responded by writing to Secretary of State Newcastle. It was noted that the 
Spanish were demanding this issue be placed before King George himself in the 
knowledge that the Asiento had become a national concern. It was suspected that the 
Spanish were attempting to involve sovereigns as a prelude to more radical 
measures. Hence, it was advised that directors of the SSC should convince Geraldino 
of the justice of their own case and seek to resolve disputes on reasonable terms. 
Keene suggested that a committee be formed to prevent the mounting recriminations 
on both sides - a suggestion that was not taken up (SP94/123, 15.8.1735; Hildner, 
1938).  Responses by the SSC to Spanish complaints failed to take the heat out of the 
situation. In a letter to Keene in November 1735 Patiño concluded that the SSC was 
merely responding to grievances by heaping up its own complaints. This was a 
device for “swerving from the truth, or omitting those arguments by which their 
complaints have been fully confuted, with the only view of carrying on an illicit 
trade, and concealing thereby their own private gains” (SP94/123, 6.11.1735).  
 
Geraldino eventually received an account of the profits of the Royal Caroline from 
the SSC. This was sent with his report to the Spanish Minister of Treasury on 28 
December 1735 (AGI. Sección de Contaduría. 266). His calculations were more 
comprehensive than those previously performed by Ávila, who kept records for the 
sale of merchandise in Veracruz and the cost of the returns brought back to England.  
The calculations of the SSC indicated that the round trip of the Royal Caroline 
produced a net profit of £125,834, though this figure was disputed by the Spanish 
(AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2790). Hence, the interest of the Spanish monarch 
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in the venture, after deducting 8% annual interest on the loan granted to him by the 
SSC, was £27,896. The Ministry of Treasury expressed some serious concerns about 
the fairness of the calculations. 
(Figure 1 to appear about here) 
(Figure 2 to appear about here) 
Neither side satisfied the demands of the other. By early 1736 there was stalemate 
(Hildner, 1938). Spanish frustration at the non-submission of acceptable accounts 
and the share of profits of the Royal Caroline was indicated by a reluctance to grant 
a cedula (license) for the next annual ship (SP36/40, 21.1.1737). Although Keene 
proposed to remit to the Court of Spain the share of profits made by the Royal 
Caroline if the cedula was granted, the SSC continued to refuse to pay them 
(SP36/40, 24.2.1737). When a cedula was eventually received the conditions 
attached to it rendered it impracticable for the SSC to provide a cargo and despatch a 
ship (SP36/45).  
 
Failure to manage treaty noncompliance  
 
Attempts to manage alleged noncompliance arising from treaty ambiguity through 
political processes proved fruitless as the matter of accounting for the annual ship 
was compounded by other issues which contributed to deteriorating relations 
between Britain and Spain. The period 1737-1739 has been described as ‘The 
Depredations Crisis’ in which the British and Spanish sought satisfaction for their 
claims against each other (McLachlan, 1940, p. 78).  
 
In 1737 Geraldino and Newcastle held discussions to settle the claims of the two 
states. On 2 January 1738 Geraldino reported to Patiño on a recent meeting with 
Newcastle which had addressed the value of seizures and losses of the SSC (AGI. 
Indiferente General. Legajo 2851). Later during 1738 Geraldino and Stert (who had 
been a commissary under the Treaty of Seville) thrashed out a settlement of British 
and Spanish claims. This determined that a balance of £140,000 was payable by 
Spain to Britain for seizures and losses (Hildner, 1938; McLachlan, 1940; 
Temperley, 1909; SP94/131).  
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In Madrid, similar negotiations involved Josef de la Quintana (who replaced Patiño 
as chief negotiator in 1736) and Ambassador Keene (AGS. Est. Legajos 7625 and 
7632). In November 1738 Quintana and Keene reached an agreement on the 
following issues: (i) the value of seizures, as reported by the SSC, would be accepted 
by the Spanish; (ii) the period of the Asiento should be extended for the years in 
suspension during wars between the two countries; (iii) the King of Spain should 
return the cash advance of 200,000 pesos; (iv) Spain should grant permits to annual 
ships with larger cargos; (v) in return, the SSC should deliver the accounts of the 
Negro trade and annual ships, albeit by using a less strict accounting system (i.e. one 
focused on the cash account); (vi) the SSC should pay its duties for the introduction 
of Negroes, that is, 68,000 pesos at an agreed exchange rate between the national 
currencies of 52 pennies/peso. The last two clauses were deemed fundamental if the 
Spanish were to sign the agreement. Without satisfaction on these points the Spanish 
warned that they would suspend the Asiento. Although the Head of the Department 
of the Indies in Madrid (and a former commissary under the Treaty of Seville) 
continued to complain that the chief sticking point was the refusal of the SSC to 
provide an undisputed account of the profits of the last annual ship (Hildner, 1938), 
the general terms of the agreement between Quintana and Keene secured a 
temporary accord as the Convention of El Pardo on 14 January1739.  
 
Despite being criticised within his Privy Council, King George II endorsed the 
agreement on 4 February 1739 (AHN. Est., Legajo 3365) but when its details were 
disclosed there was an adverse public reaction. Objections were raised to the 
payment of 68,000 pesos to the King of Spain. On 12 March the general assembly of 
the SSC decided not to pay the sum and requested George II to call a general 
election. In order to calm the situation Parliament broke for a three week vacation.  
 
However, in April-May 1739 “came the final rupture of the Spanish Government 
with the South Sea Company” (Temperley, 1909, p. 231). The Spanish demanded 
that unless the agreed 68,000 pesos was paid by the SSC it would not remit £95,000 
to the British Crown and would suspend the Asiento (Batchelor, 1925; Hildner, 
1938; Pares, 1936, pp. 52-57). This fracturing of a bilateral treaty made the prospect 
of peace remote. The British government supported the claims of the SSC. On 4 
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June, Ambassador Keene forwarded a letter to the Spanish King stating that his debt 
with the SSC was “infinitely higher than the sum stated for seizures” (AGI. 
Indiferente. 2786). In June the payment of £95,000 by Spain became overdue and its 
government affirmed that it would not comply until the SSC had remitted what it 
owed the Spanish Crown. Anti-Spanish sentiment had been running high since 1738 
following revelations of cruelty, such as the cutting off of the ear of Captain Robert 
Jenkins by guarda-costas in Havana in 1731. War was declared by Britain on 19 
October 1739. Two years after the resumption of peaceful relations between the two 
countries in 1748 the Asiento was ended under a commercial treaty between Britain 
and Spain (McLachlan, 1940, pp. 132-145; Pares, 1936, pp. 517-533). 
 
Thus a key feature of the depredations crisis was the ongoing failure by the SSC to 
account and report in a transparent manner. As realists would contend this failure 
and consequent noncompliance was driven by the SSC’s determination to preserve 
its own interests. In such circumstances attempts to manage treaty noncompliance 
proved futile. The determination not to comply with the accounting provisions of the 
Asiento treaty (in the context of Spanish knowledge of secret accounts kept by the 
SSC which proved clandestine trading) and the ambiguity over reporting the 
accounts of annual ships was a constant source of friction between Britain and Spain.  
 
Historians continue to debate the causes of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, 1739-1748. 
Having reviewed the secondary sources Levy & Young (2008) recently contested the 
notion that this was simply a trade war and point to the importance of British 
military-strategic and domestic political factors to explaining the conflict. But even 
revisionist accounts concede that the commercial dispute between Britain and Spain 
was “a necessary condition for war” (Levy & Young, 2008, p. 27). Our examination 
of archival material relating to both nations tends to affirm the view that “in 1739 
England and Spain had gone to war, nominally over Captain Jenkins’ ear, but in fact 
to settle the disputed asiento which had been granted to England at the Peace of 
Utrecht” (Andrews, 1965, p. 182; Kamen, 2002, p. 471). Moreover, an important, if 
unglamorous, element of this dispute centring on the Asiento was a failure to 
account. As Nelson (1945, p. 67) observed: 
Unable to accept the destruction of its commercial system, Spain attempted to negotiate but requested 
that the [South Sea] company, as an evidence of good faith, should open its accounts for inspection by 
the Spanish representatives. Naturally, the directors refused, for compliance would have meant the 
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complete exposure of the illegal traffic. Neither Spain nor the South Sea Company would yield. War 
was the inevitable result… 
 
Conclusions  
 
Through a study of the Asiento treaty between Britain and Spain an attempt has been 
made to extend research on the interfaces between accounting and law to the 
international domain. In modern times the original, subordinated role of accounting 
to law has experienced a transformation consequent upon the growing dependence of 
law on accountancy and the increasing reliance on calculative techniques in the 
governance of economic and social institutions (Miller & Napier, 1993). Our 
findings indicate that changes in these relationships may not have exhibited a path of 
temporal or spatial linearity. The investigation has illustrated the centrality of 
accounting to the operation of an international treaty and the discourses surrounding 
its performance during the eighteenth century. Such episodes indicate the potential 
for demonstrating that “the boundaries of accounting and law are not given, but can 
be viewed as continually negotiated and renegotiated” (Miller & Power, 1992, p. 
251).  
 
The study reported here indicates that when an international perspective is taken 
more complex, multi-layered dimensions of the relationships between accounting 
and law may be revealed. The Asiento treaty was attended by an increasing emphasis 
on accounting through the hierarchy of institutions engaged in its operationalisation. 
These comprised international committees, nation states, the agents of nation states 
and local operators. Accounting featured large in the work of an international 
committee such as the Treaty of Seville Commission. At nation state level the 
delivery of accounts became central to the negotiations between Britain and Spain 
(AGS. Est. Legajos 6882 and 6883; SP94/106, 13.3.1732). At the level of agents of 
the state, accounting became a core issue during discussions between the Assientists 
(the SSC) and the British government, and with representatives of the Spanish 
crown. At the operational level, officers of the SSC and local factors were conscious 
of the importance of accounting procedures and account books to day-to-day activity 
and the reporting hierarchy above them.   
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The investigation has revealed the manner in which accounting may be implicated in 
international relations and we concur with Richardson and MacDonald (2002) about 
the merits of drawing on work in that field. Our particular focus concerns literature 
on treaty compliance, transparency and reporting. It has been shown that accounting 
was not only significant to the performance of the Asiento it also featured 
significantly in the deteriorating relations between Britain and Spain which 
culminated in the outbreak of war in 1739. The investigation indicates that in the 
context of hostility between nations and the geopolitics of the international arena the 
significance of accounting systems can be heightened. As Power (1997, p. 1) 
reminds us “accounts only become objects of explicit checking in situations of 
doubt, conflict, mistrust, and danger”. Relations between Britain and Spain in the 
early eighteenth century were not characterized by that mutual trust which “releases 
us from the need for checking” (Power, 1997, p. 1). On the contrary, during the years 
of the Asiento treaty relations “were prickly in the best periods and bitterly hostile in 
the worst” (Palmer, 1981, p. 132). Furthermore, the paper indicates the deficiencies 
of accounting as a mechanism for achieving transparency in treaty compliance. This 
stems from the subjectivity inherent in accounting practice, the scope for 
manipulation and the extent to which interpretations of what it discloses may be 
ideologically charged. When accounting becomes politicised and operates in 
situations of asymmetries of power between nation states its potential as an objective 
technology of treaty verification is difficult to achieve.xiii
 
  
While the analysis performed here is not explicitly comparative in orientation it has 
highlighted the importance of identifying national differences when exploring 
international accounting phenomena in historical contexts (Carnegie & Napier, 
2002). The study indicates that the effectiveness of accounting in treaty compliance 
is rendered complex by divergent legal, political and cultural structures of signatory 
states. The effectiveness of information flows in compliance depends on a shared 
understanding of the significance and nature of the data exchanged. In relation to the 
Asiento there were evidently divergent perceptions in Britain and Spain about the 
accountings produced to monitor and verify adherence. The discourses related above 
have revealed different conceptions of the importance of accounting and control in 
the two nations - divergent notions of the manner in which accounts are constructed, 
the frequency of their production, acceptable degrees of disclosure and bases of 
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measurement. Given the absolutist, regulated nature of the Spanish state during the 
eighteenth century, its civil law tradition of codes, and the manner in which 
accounting and control had become ingrained in the monitoring of the operations of 
individuals, firms and organs of public administration (Hernández Esteve, 1983, 
1986, 1988; Donoso Anes, 1996; Carmona & Donoso, 2004), it was no surprise to 
discover Spanish insistence on the regular supply of comprehensive accounting 
information by the contractors of the Asiento.  
 
However, the party obliged to supply the accounts appears to have accorded less 
significance to the obligation. The SSC maintained a loose system of control. Its 
factors were obliged to render accounts on a two-year basis (Sorsby, 1975) and did 
not submit diaries or ledgers until the Asiento was well under way (AGI. Sección 
Contaduría. 266). The refusal of the SSC to respond positively to requests to submit 
accounts, as required under the treaty, appeared incomprehensible to the Spanish 
who assumed that private behaviour would conform to the will of the state (Johnson, 
1981). The relationships between the British government and the SSC operated 
within a constitutional monarchy and a common law tradition which increasingly 
emphasised liberty, individualism and the legal rights of investors. It is significant 
that the ‘Glorious Revolution’ had commenced in 1688 and the Bill of Rights was 
passed in 1689 (LaPorta et al, 1998; Teeven, 1990, chapter 4).  
 
Under such circumstances, the British Crown was not possessed of the necessary 
authority to compel the SSC to render accounts of the Asiento. The SSC had 
considerable influence within the state, borne of the interest of the Crown in the 
company and, most importantly, its role in securing British influence and access to 
markets in Latin America. Hence, following the Convention of El Pardo, 1739 it was 
established that George II did not have sufficient power to secure SSC compliance 
with the conditions of an international treaty endorsed by the British government 
(AHN. Est., Legajo 3365). The British also appear to have adhered to the strict, 
classical notion of sovereignty whereby the state was deemed to be under no 
obligation to notify other parties of its actions even where they had an interest in the 
matter (Chayes & Chayes, 1995, p. 168).  
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Ultimately, as contemporary commentators recognise, in the realm of treaty 
behaviour “cultural and social contexts may make compliance significantly more 
difficult to elicit from the companies and citizens of one country than those of 
another” (Mitchell, 1994, p. 45). Divergent constitutional and political structures also 
play a part, particularly in pre-globalisation eras. Diverse legal systems and concepts 
are also significant. In the countries and period discussed above the patterns of 
reform in mercantile and private law varied significantly (Mills, 1990) and the 
differences between the common and civil law traditions coloured assumptions about 
accounting and its performance (Johnson, 1981). While they complicate the scene 
such contrasts also provide unique settings for investigating the “unstable” 
relationships between accounting and law in the international arena (Napier & Noke, 
1992). Such contrasts also indicate the advantages of venturing beyond the common 
law sites which have tended to predominate in studies of the relationship between 
accounting and law (Johnson & Gunn, 1974).  
The findings discussed above offer scope for commenting on the relative potency of 
the managerialist and realist paradigms of treaty behaviour. Managerialists contend 
that noncompliance can be addressed through routine processes of dispute resolution 
and persuasion rather than formal enforcement. The process of dispute resolution is 
epitomised by ‘jawboning’ - “an effort to persuade the miscreant to change its ways” 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 204). The current study suggests that although such 
processes were instituted to ‘manage’ the noncompliance of the SSC these solutions 
were ineffective. Whilst the British party to the treaty had assumed a calculated 
approach to the benefits of noncompliance the Spanish engaged in activities designed 
to provoke the British withdrawal from the Asiento (Memo issued by the Baron of 
Ripperdá in 1724, see Coxe, 1846, Volume II, pp. 365-370). The international arena 
portrayed in the paper was decidedly competitive and relations between the states 
were lacking in trust; the scene witnessed a struggle for power, wealth and security 
between Britain and Spain (Donnelly, 2000).  
Under these circumstances, how would adherents to the realist and managerialist 
approaches explain noncompliance with the accounting provisions of the Asiento 
treaty? Managerialists contend that noncompliance can arise from factors such as 
incapacity to meet obligations and treaty ambiguity, as opposed to wilful violation. 
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Indeed, in the case discussed here, the SSC claimed that its ability to comply with 
accounting obligations was thwarted by interruptions to trade and loss of records due 
to military conflict and Spanish seizures. It is also evident that the conduct of the 
Asiento through the agency of the SSC complicated reporting by the British 
government to the Spanish Crown and there was indeterminacy regarding the 
obligation to submit accounts of the annual ships. Different levels of signification 
were accorded to accounting mechanisms by the British and Spanish governments. 
However, given the production of private accounts which revealed the material gains 
of illicit trading it would appear that incapacity and the existence of a “zone of 
ambiguity” in the Asiento treaty were utilised as further opportunities to pursue self 
interested objectives (Chayes & Chayes, 1995, p. 191). Consequently, the behaviour 
of the SSC and the British state (and also some Spanish agents and officials), was 
focussed on maximising gain and seeking advantage. For these reasons a realist 
interpretation of noncompliance with the Asiento treaty appears most convincing. 
Explanations and remedies for noncompliance with the accounting provisions of the 
Asiento also suggested the primacy of realist behaviour. Managerialists emphasise 
that international cooperation is facilitated and issues of noncompliance addressed 
through greater transparency. However, for this to be effective the parties have to 
establish a common perception of the form, content and interpretation of the 
information shared (Morrow, 1994). As we have seen informational transparency 
through accounting for the Asiento was seldom achieved in a context of wide cultural 
differences and where the pursuit of self-interest and gain was prioritised. As Downs 
et al (1996) remind us the benefits of cheating may be too high to be countered by 
transparency alone. Moreover, in the case of the Asiento rather than nurture trust, 
encourage reciprocity and reduce uncertainty, the actualisation of transparency and 
verification through accounting disclosures became an additional source of conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 48 
 
References  
Primary sources  
Archivo General de Indias de Sevilla (A.G.I.)  
 
Sección Indiferente General: 
Legajo 1597 
Legajo 2769, L 8 
Legajo 2769, L9 
Legajo 2769, L10 
Legajo 2769, L17 
Legajo 2769, L22 
Legajo 2769, L28 
Legajo 2769, L29 
Legajo 2773 
Legajo 2776 
Legajo 2785 
Legajo 2786 
Legajo 2789 
Legajo 2790 
Legajo 2791 
Legajo 2792 
Legajo 2801 
Legajo 2802 
Legajo 2809 
Legajo 2812 
Legajo 2814 
Legajo 2851 
 
Sección Contaduría: 
 
Legajo266 
Legajo895 
Archivo General de Simancas, Simancas, Valladolid 
AGS. Est. Legajo 6820 
AGS. Est. Legajo 6822 
AGS. Est. Legajo 6882  
AGS. Est. Legajo 6883 
AGS. Est. Legajo 6896 
AGS. Est. Legajo 7625  
AGS. Est. Legajo 7632 
Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid 
AHN, Est. Legs. 3365 at. 35 
 49 
The National Archives, Kew, London 
Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Spain, 1577-1780: 
 
SP94/106 
SP94/123 
SP94/124 
SP94/131 
 
Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, George II, 1718-1760: 
 
SP36/30 
SP36/35 
SP36/37 
SP36/40 
SP36/45 
Secondary sources 
Aiton, A.S. (1928). The asiento treaty as reflected in the papers of Lord Shelburne. 
Hispanic American Historical Review 8 (2), 167-177. 
 
Alvarez-Dardet Espejo, C., Baños Sánchez-Matamoros, J. & Carrasco Fenech, F. 
(2002). Accounting and control in the founding of the new settlements in Sierra 
Morena and Andalucía. European Accounting Review 11 (2), 419-439. 
 
Andrews, S. 1965). Eighteenth-century Europe. The 1680s to 1815. London: 
Longmans. 
 
Artola, M. (1982). La hacienda del antiguo régimen. Madrid: Alianza. 
 
Avenhaus, R., Kyriakopoulos, N., Richard, M. & Stein, G. (2006). Verifying treaty 
compliance: Limiting weapons of mass destruction and monitoring Kyoto protocol 
provisions. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.  
 
Batchelor, L.E.M. (1925). The South Sea Company and the assiento. Bulletin of the 
Institute of Historical Research 3 (8), 128-130. 
 
Bednar, J. (2006). Is full compliance possible? Conditions for shirking with 
imperfect monitoring and continuous action spaces, Journal of Theoretical Politics 
18 (3), 347-375.  
 
Bernal, A.M. (2001). Borbones por Austrias. El papel de la corona en el comercio 
colonial. Jaén: Universidad de Jaén. 
 
Béthencourt, A. (1998). Relaciones de España bajo Felipe V. Del Tratado de Sevilla 
a la Guerra de la Independencia (1729-1739). Madrid: Asociación Española de 
Historia Moderna.  
 50 
 
 
 
 
Bromwich, M. & Hopwood, A. (eds) (1992). Accounting and the law. Hemel 
Hemstead: Prentice Hall. 
 
Brown, V.L. (1926). The South Sea Company and contraband trade. American 
Historical Review 31 (4), 662-678. 
 
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A.G., Hughes, J. & Nahapiet, J. (1980). The roles 
of accounting in organizations and society. Accounting, Organizations and Society 5 
(1), 5-27. 
 
Camfferman, K. (2007). Civil-law jurisprudence on financial reporting in the 
Netherlands, 1880-1970. Paper presented at the EAA Congress, Lisbon. 
 
Carmona, S. & Donoso, R. (2004). Cost accounting in early regulated markets: The 
case of the Royal Soap Factory of Seville (1525-1692). Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy 23 (5), 129-157.   
 
Carmona, S., Donoso, R. & Ezzamel, M. (2008). Accountants and trans-Atlantic 
trade: The Board of Trade of Seville (1502-1710). IE Business School Working 
Papers Series.  
 
Carnegie, G.D. & Napier, C.J. (2002). Exploring comparative international 
accounting history, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 15 (5), 689-718. 
 
Carswell, J. (1960). The south sea bubble. London: The Cresset Press. 
 
Chayes, A. & Chayes, A.H. (1995). The new sovereignty. Compliance with 
international regulatory agreements. London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Chayes, A. & Chayes, A.H. (1993) On compliance, International Organization 47 
(2), 175-205. 
 
Chwastiac, M. (2001). Taming the untameable: planning, programming and 
budgeting and the normalization of war, Accounting, Organizations & Society 26 
(6), 501-519. 
 
Chwastiac, M. (2006). Rationality, performance measures and representations of 
reality: planning, programming and budgeting and the Vietnam War, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 17 (1), 29-55. 
 
Clapham, J. (1949). A concise economic history of Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Colgan, J. (2006) Treaty compliance: lessons from the softwood lumber case, 
Journal of Public and International Affairs 17, 47-60. 
 
 51 
A collection of all the treaties (1785). London: J.J. Debrett.  
 
A collection of treaties of peace and commerce (1714). London: J. Baker. 
 
Coxe, G. (1846). España bajo el Reinado de la Casa de Borbón, desde 1700, en que 
subió al trono Felipe V, hasta la muerte de Carlos II, acaecida en 1788. Madrid: 
Establecimiento Tipográfico de D. F. de P. Mellado- Editor. Four Volumes. 
 
Donelan, M. (1990). Elements of international political theory. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
 
Donnan, E. (1930). The early days of the South Sea Company, 1711-1718.Journal of 
Economic and Business History, Vol. II, 419-450. 
 
Donnelly, J. (2000). Realism and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Donoso, R. (1996). Análisis de las Prácticas Contables Desarrolladas por la Tesorería 
de la Casa de la Contratación de las Indias en Sevilla (1503-1717). Sevilla: 
Universidad de Sevilla. 
 
Donoso, R. (2002). Accounting and slavery: The accounts of the English South Sea 
Company. European Accounting Review 11 (2), 441-452.  
 
Donoso, R. (2008). La compañía del asiento y la guerra de la oreja de Jenkins: Sus 
causas económicas y algunos aspectos contables relacionados. Revista de 
Contabilidad 11 (1), 9-40. 
 
Downs, G.W., Rocke, D.M. & Barsoom, P.N. (1996). Is the news about compliance 
good news about cooperation? International Organization 50 (3), 379-406. 
 
Fernández-Revuelta, L., Gómez, D. & Robson, K. (2002). Fuerzas Motrices del 
Valle de Lecrín, 1936-9: Accounting reports and ideological struggles in time of 
civil war. Accounting, Business & Financial History 12 (2), 347-366. 
 
Freedman, J. & Power, M. (eds) (1992). Law and accountancy - conflict and co-
operation. London: Paul Chapman Publishing.  
 
Funnell, W. (1990). Pathological responses to accounting controls: The British 
commissariat in the Crimea 1854-1856. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1 (4), 
310-335. 
 
Funnell, W. (2005). Accounting on the frontline: Cost accounting, military efficiency 
and the South African War. Accounting and Business Research 35 (4), 307-326. 
 
Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (1991). The aura of accounting in the context of a crisis: 
Germany and the First World War. Accounting, Organizations and Society 16 (5/6), 
487-520.  
 
A general collection of treaties (1732). London: J.J. & P. Knapton.  
 52 
 
Hernández Esteve, E. (1983). Creación del Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla: 1523-
1525. Madrid: Banco de España. 
 
Hernández Esteve, E. (1986). Establecimiento de la Partida Doble en las Cuentas 
Centrales de la Real Hacienda: Pedro Luis de Torregrosa, Primer Contador del 
Libro de Caja. Madrid: Banco de España.  
 
Hernández Esteve, E. (1988). Contribución al Estudio de las Ordenanzas de los 
Reyes Católicos sobre la Contaduría Mayor de Hacienda y sus Oficios. Madrid: 
Banco de España. 
 
Hildner, E.G. Jr. (1938). The role of the South Sea Company in the diplomacy 
leading to the War of Jenkins’ Ear, 1729-1939. Hispanic American Historical 
Review 18 (3), 322-341. 
 
Hogan, M.J. (2004). The future of diplomatic history in a global age. Diplomatic 
History 28 (1), 1-21. 
 
Holzgreve, J.L. (1989). The origins of modern international relations theory. Review 
of International Studies 15, 11-26. 
 
Hopwood, A.G. (1983). On trying to study accounting in the contexts in which it 
operates. Accounting, Organizations and Society 8 (2/3), 287-303.  
 
Hopwood, A.G. (1992). Accounting calculation and the shifting sphere of the 
economy. European Accounting Review 1 (1), 147-160. 
 
Johnson, O. (1981). Some implications of the United States constitution for 
accounting institution alternatives. Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement, 89-
119. 
 
Johnson, O. & Gunn, S. (1974). Conflict resolution: The market and/or the auditor. 
The Accounting Review 49 (4), 649-663. 
 
Jover Zamora, J. M. (1985). La Época de los Primeros Borbones: La Nueva 
Monarquía y su Posición en Europa (1700-1759). In Menéndez Pidal, R. (ed.), 
Historia de España, Volume 1 (pp. 25-44). Madrid: Espasa Calpe. 
 
Kamen, H. (2002). Spain’s road to empire. The making of a world power 1492-1763. 
London: Penguin. 
 
Keeley, J.F. (1998). Compliance and the non-proliferation treaty: Developments in 
safeguards and supply controls. In Canadian Council on International Law and the 
Markland Group (eds) Treaty compliance: Some concerns and remedies (pp. 21-34). 
London: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Keohane, R.O. (1982). The demand for international regimes. International 
Organization 36 (2), 325-355. 
 
 53 
Klamer, A. & McCloskey, D. (1992). Accounting as the master metaphor of 
economics. European Accounting Review 1 (1), 145-160. 
 
LaPorta, R., López de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. (1998). Law and 
finance. Journal of Political Economy 106 (6), 1113-1155. 
 
Laughton, J. K. (1889). Jenkins’s ear. English Historical Review 4 (16), 741-749. 
 
Levy, J.S. & Young, P.T. (2008). Domestic politics and the escalation of commercial 
rivalry: Explaining the war of Jenkins’ ear, 1739-48. Saltzman Working Paper No. 8. 
 
Loft, A. (1994). Accountancy and the First World War. In Hopwood, A.G. and 
Miller, P. Accounting as social and institutional practice (pp. 116-137). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lynch, J. (1999). La España del siglo XVIII. Barcelona: Ed. Crítica. 
 
Maier, C.S. (2000). Consigning the twentieth century to history: Alternative 
narratives for the modern era. American Historical Review 105 (3), 807-831. 
 
Martens, S.C. & McEnroe, J.E. (1991). Interprofessional struggles over definition: 
lawyers, accountants and illegal acts. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 2, 375-
384.  
 
Martens, S.C. & McEnroe, J.E. (1998). Interprofessional conflict, accommodation, 
and the flow of capital: The ASB vs. the securities industry and its lawyers. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 23 (4), 361-376. 
 
Marwick, A. (1989). The nature of history. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Mathias, P. (1969). The first industrial nation. London: Methuen. 
 
McKay, D. & Scott, H.M. (1983). The rise of the great powers 1648-1815. London: 
Routledge. 
 
McLachlan, J.O. (1940). Trade and peace with old Spain, 1667-1750. Cambridge: 
University Press. 
 
Mearsheimer, J.J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. 
International Security 19 (3), 5-26. 
 
Miller, P. (1998). The margins of accounting. European Accounting Review 7 (4), 
605-621. 
 
Miller, P. & Napier, C. (1993). Genealogies of calculation. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 18 (7/8), 631-647.  
 
Miller, P. & Power, M. (1992). Accounting, law and economic calculation. In 
Bromwich, M. & Hopwood, A.G. (eds). Accounting and the law (pp. 230-253). 
Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall and ICAEW. 
 54 
 
Mills, P.A. (1990). Agency, auditing and the unregulated environment. Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal 3 (1), 54-66. 
 
Mitchell, R.B. (1994). Intentional oil pollution at sea. Environmental policy and 
treaty compliance. London: MIT Press. 
 
Morgenthau, H.J. (1954). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Morrow, J.D. (1994). Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution 
versus information. International Organization 48 (3), 387-423. 
 
Napier, C.J. (1998a). Intersections of law and accounting: Unlimited auditor liability 
in the United Kingdom. Accounting, Organizations and Society 23 (1), 230-253. 
 
Napier, C.J. (1998b). Editorial. Accounting, regulation and the law. Accounting 
History 3 (1), 5-8.  
 
Napier, C.J. & Noke, C.W. (1992). Accounting and law: A historical overview of an 
uneasy relationship. In Bromwich, M. and Hopwood, A.G. (eds.), Accounting and 
the law (pp. 30-54). Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall and ICAEW. 
 
Nelson, G.H. (1945). Contraband trade under the asiento, 1730-1739. American 
Historical Review 51 (1) 55-67. 
 
Nueva Recopilación de las Leyes del Reino y Autos Acordados (1567). Version 
published in 1982. Madrid: Editorial Lex Nova.  
 
Nussbaum, A. (1953). A concise history of the law of nations. New York: Macmillan 
Company. 
 
Ostrom, E. (1999). Coping with tragedies of the commons. Annual Review of 
Political Science 2, 493-535. 
 
Palacios Preciados, J. (1973). La trata de negros por Cartagena de Indias. Tunja: 
Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia.  
 
Palmer, C. (1981). Human cargoes. The British slave trade to Spanish America, 
1700-1739. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Pares, R. (1936). War and trade in the West Indies 1739-1763. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
 
Paul, H.J. (2006). The South Sea Company and the Royal African Company’s 
combined slaving activities. Paper presented at the Economic History Society 
Conference, Reading. 
 
Pérez Fernández- Turégano, C. (2006).  Patiño y las reformas de la administración 
en el reinado de Felipe V. Madrid: Publicaciones de Defensa.  
 55 
 
Pong, C.K.M. (1999). Jurisdictional contests between accountants and lawyers: The 
case of off-balance sheet finance, 1985-1990. Accounting History 4 (1), 7-29. 
 
Power, M. (1997). The audit society: Rituals of verification. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Reuter, P. (1995). Introduction to the law of treaties. London: Kegan Paul 
International. 
 
Richardson, A.J. & MacDonald, L.D. (2002). Linking international business theory 
to accounting history: Implications of international evolution of the state and the firm 
for accounting history research. Accounting and Business Research 32 (2), 67-78.  
 
Scelle, G. (1910). The slave-trade in the Spanish colonies of America: the Assiento. 
American Journal of International Law 4 (3), 612-661. 
 
Simmons, B.A. (1998). Compliance with international agreements. Annual Review of 
Political Science 1 (1), 75-93.  
 
 
Simmons, B.A. (2000). International law and state behaviour: Commitment and 
compliance in international monetary affairs. American Political Science Review 94 
(4), 819-835. 
 
Sorsby, G.V. (1975). British trade with Spanish America under the asiento (1713-
1740). Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London. 
 
Stephanson, A. (1998). Diplomatic history in the expanded field. Diplomatic History 
22 (4), 595-603. 
 
Sugarman, D. (1995). Who colonized whom? Historical reflections on the 
intersection between law, lawyers and accountants in England. In Y. Dezalay & D. 
Sugarman (eds.) Professional competition and professional power. Lawyers, 
accountants and the social construction of markets (pp. 226-237). London: 
Routledge. 
 
Teeven, K.M. (1990). A history of the Anglo-American common law of contract. 
New York: Greenwood Press. 
 
Temperley, H.W.V. (1909). The causes of the War of Jenkins Ear, 1739. 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3rd Series, 3, 197-236. 
 
Thomas, H. (1998). La trata de esclavos. Historia del tráfico de seres humanos de 
1440 a 1870. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta.   
 
Toscano, M. (1966). The history of treaties and international politics. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press. 
 
 56 
Tulliu, S. & Schmalberger, T. (2004). Lexicon for arms control, disarmament and 
confidence building. Geneva: United Nations Publications. 
 
Vincent, J. (1996). An intelligent person’s guide to history. London: G. Duckworth 
& Co.  
 
Walker, S.P. (2000). Editorial, Accounting in crises. Accounting History 5 (2), 5-12. 
 
Walker, S.P. (2004). Conflict, collaboration, fuzzy jurisdictions and partial 
settlements. Accountants, lawyers and insolvency practice during the late nineteenth 
century. Accounting and Business Research 34 (3), 247-265. 
 
Walker, S.P. & Shackleton, K. (1995). Corporatism and structural change in the 
British accountancy profession, 1930-1957. Accounting, Organizations and Society 
20 (6), 467-503.  
 
Walton, P.J. (1993). Research forum: Company law and accounting in nineteenth 
century Europe. European Accounting Review 2 (2), 285-375. 
 
Watt, D.C., Adams, S., Bullen, R., Brauer, K. & Iriye, A. (1988). What is diplomatic 
history? In Gardiner, J. (ed) What is history today? (pp. 131-142). Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
 
Williams, B. (1900). The foreign policy of England under Walpole. English 
Historical Review 15 (58), 251-276. 
 
Williams, B. (1901). The foreign policy of England under Walpole (continued). 
English Historical Review 16 (62), 308-327. 
 
Zeiler, T.W. (2001). Just do it! Globalization for diplomatic historians. Diplomatic 
History 25 (4), 529-551. 
 
Zeller, G. (1955). L’histoire des relations internationals. Paris: Hachette.  
 
(http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp). Accessed 6 June 2006. 
 57 
 
 
Figure 1  
Royal Caroline: Profit and Loss Account (Summary) 
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Figure 2 
Royal Caroline: Distribution of Profits 
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NOTES 
 
i It should be noted that some scholars, particularly in continental Europe, distinguish diplomatic 
history from the history of treaties. The former concerns the history of relations between nations. The 
latter comprises two streams: i) treaties and the history of international law, ii) the history of treaties 
as reflective of the economic, ideological, social and political complexions of the states which they 
involve (see Toscano, 1966, pp. 1-7). 
ii The AGI is an essential source for examining the relationships between Spain and its overseas 
colonies. It is  well preserved and easily available.  
iii  In modern times measurement technologies are to be found in treaties relating to nuclear 
proliferation, chemical and biological weapons and climatic change. Verification systems may 
comprise the collection of information gathered from data declarations and exchanges, physical 
inspections and monitoring, and the employment of surveillance technologies such as satellites, 
aircraft and ground-based sensors (Tulliu & Schmalberger, 2004, chap. 10). Accounting also features 
in some treaty verification and reporting regimes. For example, in non-proliferation treaties the 
International Atomic Energy Agency has utilised nuclear ‘materials accounting’ as a principal 
technique (Keeley, 1998). 
iv To determine the number of Piezas de Indias, the height of Negroes was measured (palmeo). The 
unit of measure was the “hand” and the height of Negroes had to be at least seven hands 
(approximately 1.50 metres) to be considered a Pieza de Indias. The ‘height’ could be adjusted in 
consequence of physical or mental disease. The resulting number was then divided by seven to 
determine the equivalence of each Negro as Pieza de Indias.  
v The silver peso escudo was the currency used in the Indies. It was worth eight Reales of silver. 
Interestingly, the silver peso escudo was the unit of measurement used in the Spanish accounting 
books studied in this investigation.  
vi The accounting system of the SSC during the early Asiento is discussed in Donoso (2002).  
vii Three months before the treaty was signed unresolved issues concerned matters other than 
accounting such as the suspension of the Asiento in the event of the outbreak of war and the 
introduction of free trade with Spanish American colonies (AGS. Est. Legajos. 6820, 6822). By 
February 1713 the British and Spanish negotiators were interested in the rate of tax to be applied 
when the number of slaves supplied to Spanish factories exceeded the annual quota (AGI. Indiferente 
General. Legajo, 2773).  
viii The Spanish representative to the Court of the SSC had access to the ‘official’ accounts of the 
company. As noted in the foregoing, the SSC failed to report regularly to the Spanish on its activities 
and obviously provided no access to its secret books. Disclosures by insiders such as Plowes and 
Burnet were therefore the principal source of data for the Spanish on the illicit trading conducted by 
the SSC.  
ix The SSC complained that this was in breach of article 28 of the Asiento which stated that the 
Spanish would appoint two managers or factors in London, one in Cádiz and only two in the Indies (A 
Collection of all the Treaties, 1785; AGI. Indiferente General. Legajo 2769, L8).  
x  In 1732 Geraldino, Spain’s representative on the Court of the SSC, was remitted by King Philip to 
propose to the SSC that the annual ship be discontinued for an equivalent (SP36/30, 8.9.1733; AGI. 
Indiferente General. Legajo 2791). Geraldino subsequently delivered another proposal stating that the 
King of Spain would allow an equivalent for the remaining term of the Asiento if it were given up 
(SP36/30, 19.12.1733, 19.1.1734; also Palmer, 1981, pp. 141-142).  
xi Unbalanced figures taken from archival documents; the actual difference should be £334,271. 8.3 
xii  
Peso Real Grano 
1 8 96 
 1 12 
£ s. d. 
1 20 240 
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xiii These limitations were not only apparent in the eighteenth century context. In modern times, the 
International Atomic Energy Authority traditionally emphasized ‘materials accounting’ for 
monitoring compliance with non-proliferation treaties. Its scientific and quantitative features rendered 
materials accounting an authoritative technology, one which was also less intrusive than physical 
inspection. However, the limited assurances it afforded also became apparent. Where voluntary self-
declarations were made by nation states the accuracy and completeness of accountings were often 
questioned. It was also possible for “fully clandestine flows” to remain undetected by materials 
accounting. Neither could the technique capture the qualitative political underpinnings of 
noncompliance (Keeley, 1998, pp. 26-27). 
  
